Clemson University

TigerPrints
All Theses

Theses

12-2011

The Anglo-American Press and the 'Secret'
Rearmament of Hitler's Germany, 1933 to 1935
Jason Ranke
Clemson University, jranke@clemson.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_theses
Part of the European History Commons
Recommended Citation
Ranke, Jason, "The Anglo-American Press and the 'Secret' Rearmament of Hitler's Germany, 1933 to 1935" (2011). All Theses. 1259.
https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_theses/1259

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Theses by an authorized
administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact kokeefe@clemson.edu.

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PRESS AND THE “SECRET” REARMAMENT
OF HITLER’S GERMANY, 1933 TO 1935

A Thesis
Presented to
the Graduate School of
Clemson University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
History

by
Jason Adams Ranke
May 2009

Accepted by:
Donald McKale, Committee Chair
Alan Grubb
Roger Grant

ABSTRACT

This thesis will examine the Anglo-American press coverage of Germany’s secret
rearmament between 1933 and 1935, with the aim of pursuing three main objectives:
1. Describe the rearmament process occurring in Germany and how it related to,
or influenced, the country’s position in international affairs.
2. Investigate the accuracy and objectivity of Anglo-American press coverage of
the German rearmament. This goal will be achieved by analyzing and comparing
information from several major American and British newspapers and magazines from
1933 to 1935 with data gleaned from the principal secondary sources on Nazi
rearmament and foreign policy.
3. Determine how Hitler was perceived in the Anglo-American world, whether as
a peace-loving statesman, which he emphasized that he was repeatedly in public in his
first years in power, or as a potential threat to Europe and world peace. An analysis of the
major British and American media will provide at least an indication of whether it and its
newsmen in Germany deemed Hitler a threat. The press played a significant role, on this
news issue as on most others, in shaping public opinion in both the United States and
Britain.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

The Great War and the Armistice
On 28 July 1914 war began between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Lines were
drawn, sides were taken, and this regional conflict expanded quickly to encompass most
of Europe through various alliances. It was the Allied Powers (the Balkan area, Britain,
France, Italy, Portugal, and Russia) against the Central Powers (Austria-Hungary,
Bulgaria, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire) The United States did not enter the Great
War until April 1917 on the side of the Allied Powers.1
Fighting focused on two major fronts, the Eastern Front and the Western Front.
Most of the fighting took place on the Western Front. Both sides dug into trenches, and
neither side was ever able to make many gains when an offensive was launched. The war
was a stalemate, even with soldiers making use of modern weaponry and war machines
that included aircraft, barbed wire, flame throwers, heavy artillery, grenades, machine
guns, poison gas, tanks, and U-boats. The fighting on the Eastern Front was primarily
between Germany and Russia. After the Russian Revolution in the spring of 1917, the
Russians withdrew from the Great War and Germany shifted its troops to the Western
Front, ending fighting on the Eastern Front.
Prior to the Great War, Germany was one of the most economically and militarily
powerful states in Europe. Germany had not expected to lose the war, but it was losing
1

The term, “the Great War,” refers to the First World War. It was “great” in the fact that it was a total war
and involved most of Europe, as well as the most of the world because many of the European states had
colonies throughout the world. By the end of the Great War, no one would have ever realized that there
would be a second Great War only twenty years later.

the war. The German people, however, had been told a different story by the
government—that Germany was winning. On 9 November 1918 there was a revolution in
Germany, and Kaiser Wilhelm II was overthrown. The imperial government was replaced
with the democratic Weimar Republic. Two days later on 11 November 1918 Germany
signed an Armistice which ended the fighting in the Great War. It came as a complete
shock to the German people that they had lost the war. Many Germans refused to believe
the war was lost and concocted the belief that the new Weimar government, composed of
Communists, Jews, liberals, and socialists, had betrayed the military and “stabbed it in
the back.”2
Altogether in the war between ten to thirteen million were killed, with total
causalities estimated between twenty to forty million. The Great War was a total war,
involving complete mobilization of human and material resources. It was one of the most
destructive conflicts in history, affecting the lives of everyone in Europe, and naturally it
was on the minds of Europeans for a long time thereafter.3
The Paris Peace Conference and the Versailles Treaty
The Armistice had only ended the fighting. A formal peace had to be concluded.
In January 1919, the Paris Peace Conference was held in Paris to do just that. The leaders
from the major participants of the Allied Powers, President Georges Clemenceau from
France, Prime Minister David Lloyd-George of Britain, Italian Prime Minister Vittorio
Orlando, and President Woodrow Wilson from the United States, led the conference and
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The “stab in the back” myth is referred to as the dolchstoss myth in Germany.
For additional information about the Great War, see John Keegan, The First World War (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1998).
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would make all decisions pertaining to it. The defeated Central Powers were not allowed
to attend or participate in the Paris Peace Conference.
The decisions made by Britain, France, and the United States at the Paris Peace
Conference and the foreign policy of these countries in the 1920s and 1930s were
influenced by the horror these countries had suffered in the Great War. Britain, for one,
lost over a million men. This enormous death toll was a psychological blow to the
British. The latter also experienced widespread unemployment after the war and had to
borrow heavily from the United States. The London government realized that any
possible future war in Europe would likely not be localized. British leaders therefore
believed that they must keep local wars from starting by trying to resolve local issues
peacefully by granting concessions. Additionally, the British were horrified by the
slaughter of many of their young men, the memory of which produced widespread
pacifism and strong anti-war sentiment.
France lost about 1.5 million men in the war. Parts of northern and eastern France
were destroyed. Like Britain, France would not soon forget the conflict. The French lived
in perpetual fear of Germany and of another possible German invasion. France had been
invaded by Germany in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 and was invaded again by
Germany in the Great War. The French believed that any future war with Germany was
likely to be fought on French soil. National security and defense therefore preoccupied
France.
The United States, which entered the Great War in 1917, lost about 100,000 men.
Many Americans came to believe that the United States’ involvement in the Great War

3

was a tragic mistake and wanted the country to take the steps to avoid another conflict.
The government in Washington moved in its foreign policy towards isolationism to avoid
involvement in world affairs. As a result, the United States did not join the League of
Nations, Congress passed laws committing the nation to neutrality in the event of war
anywhere, and the size of the army was reduced.
The final settlement at the Paris Peace Conference consisted of five separate
treaties: the Treaty of St. Germaine (Austria), the Treaty of Neuilly (Bulgaria), the Treaty
of Trianon (Hungary), the Treaty of Sevres (Ottoman Empire), and the Treaty of
Versailles (Germany). The most significant of these five treaties was the Treaty of
Versailles, which Germany reluctantly signed.4
The Versailles Treaty punished Germany in several ways and was designed to
prevent it from ever engaging in another war. Germany lost its overseas colonies. Land
was taken from the eastern part of Germany and given to the Poles for the creation of a
new Poland. Alsace and Lorraine, seized by the Germans in the Franco-Prussian War,
was returned to France. The controversial Article 231, referred to as the “War Guilt
Clause” by the Germans, forced Germany to pay reparations to the Allied Powers for
war-time damages. According to this article, the war had been imposed on the Allies by
the aggression of Germany and the Central Powers. As a result, the Germans had to
accept that they had started the war.

4

For recent scholarship on the Paris Peace Conference, see Margaret MacMillan, Paris 1919: Six Months
that Changed the World (New York: Random House, 2001).
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The disarmament of the German military and its postwar organization were dealt
with specifically in Articles 159–213 in the Treaty of Versailles. Some of the major
articles are highlighted in the next several paragraphs:
Articles 159–180 concerned the German army and ground forces. Article 160
stated that “the total number…in the Army…constituting Germany must not exceed one
hundred thousand men, including officers and establishments of depots.”5 The article
ordered the disbanding of the German military leadership, the German General Staff, was
to be disbanded.6 In Article 162, the German police force was forbidden from “be[ing]
assembled for military training…[and limited to increases] to an extent corresponding to
the increase in population.”7 Hand guns, machine guns, rifles, trench mortars, and their
ammunition were to be significantly reduced in number by the Germans as specified in
Articles 164–167. Article 168 allowed the Germans to manufacture said armaments only
in factories specified by the Allied Powers within the acceptable limits. Armaments
produced in excess were to be relinquished to the Allies as laid out in Article 169.
Additionally Articles 169-171 forbade Germany from the importation and exportation of
armaments and ammunition and the production of armored cars, tanks, and poison gas.8
From these articles, army manpower and munitions were greatly limited. This was to
prevent Germany from carrying out future ground warfare in Europe by severely
weakening its capability to wage war.

5

The Treaty of Versailles and After: Annotations of the Text of the Treaty (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1947), 319.
6
Ibid., 320.
7
Ibid., 322.
8
Ibid., 326-329.
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Military conscription was prohibited by Article 173. Articles 176 and 177 closed
military schools and ended military organizations in the public schools and universities.
Article 179 prohibited Germany from active military engagement with, and occupation
of, foreign countries. Listed in Article 180, the Rhineland, the area fifty kilometers west
of the Rhine River in Germany, was to be demilitarized.9 Through these articles, the
Allied Powers were attempting to diminish the active military culture and spirit in
Germany, in the hopes of eliminating the will and desire to wage future war.
Naval and aerial regulations were covered in Articles 181–201 of the Versailles
Treaty. Article 181 permitted the Germans to have naval ships but in very limited
numbers. Of the naval vessels permitted, warships were prohibited and, in keeping with
Articles 184-185, decommissioned and forfeited to the Allied Powers. Germany was not
allowed to give to, or obtain from, other countries military naval vessels or construct
such, including submarines, according to Articles 189–191. Article 194 imposed strictly
voluntary naval service, and Article 183 limited the size of the German navy to no more
than fifteen thousand men.10
Regulations on the air force were even stricter. Article 198 mandated that “the
armed forces of Germany must not include any…air forces.”11 In keeping with Articles
199 and 201, aerial personnel were decommissioned, and all aerial equipment and planes
were demobilized and surrendered to the Allied Powers. Article 200 permitted the Allied
Powers to have open air space over Germany.12
9

Ibid., 329-333.
Ibid., 341-348.
11
Ibid., 351.
12
Ibid., 353.
10
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The articles on the navy and air force limited the power of these branches of the
German military. Like the articles dealing with the German army, these aimed at
preventing Germany from warfare in the air or on the seas throughout Europe by
weakening and even preventing the country’s capability for war. There was no doubting
or debating that Germany was to disarm and reorganize its military forces to the degree
specified by the Treaty of Versailles.
The Weimar Republic, the rise of Adolf Hitler, and the Rearmament of Germany
Despite the armament restrictions in the Versailles Treaty, during the 1920s
Germany began rearming subtly and secretly. Regarding the German army, the decade
saw the implementation of military training for the police force, the creation of the
Abwehr, or the Germany military intelligence organization, and the secret reorganization
of the German General Staff under the “guise of the Truppenamt, ostensibly charged with
overseeing Reichswehr organizational affairs.”13 Germany also readied troops through the
formation of paramilitary organizations. For example, the Black Reichswehr was
disguised as a labor organization, the Jungdeutsche Orden (Young German Order) passed
as a youth organization, and the National Socialist Party’s Sturmabteilung (the SA)14 was
billed initially as an athletic organization.15
The German air force also survived throughout the 1920s. The German
government retained a “hidden reserve of trained pilots, air crews, and ground
staff…[and] maintained a viable aeroindustry and kept it occupied with military research
13

Bart Whaley, Covert German Rearmament, 1919-1939: Deception and Misperception (Frederick:
University Publications of America, 1984), 20.
14
The SA can also be referred to as the “Brown Shirts” or the Storm Troopers.
15
Whaley, 22-23.
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and development.”16 German planes were secretly manufactured and often hidden from
inspectors of the Allied Powers. In 1926 aerial restrictions were somewhat relaxed. The
Germans were permitted to manufacture some airplanes but only for flying
competitions.17 The German navy evaded the Versailles Treaty by producing smaller but
comparable types of the ships and vessels the Treaty limited or forbade. The navy also
converted “naval organizations into civilian ones…[and] created secret arsenals.”18
In addition to Germany beginning covert rearmament in the 1920s, the country’s
future fascist leader, Adolf Hitler, appeared on the national political scene. After serving
in the Great War, Hitler was assigned by the German army to observe covertly in Munich
the numerous radical political groups and parties emerging in the city that opposed the
defeat in the war and the Versailles Treaty. Hitler was impressed greatly by a meeting of
the tiny German Workers Party in September 1919. Soon, he left the army, joined the
party, and began a career as a politician. He spoke at meetings of the German Workers
Party and drew large crowds. Eventually, he took over the party as its leader and renamed
it the National Socialist German Workers’ Party.19
By 1923, Hitler began to plot the overthrow of the democratic Weimar
government. The plans for the coup took shape in March during the Ruhr Crisis,20 but
would not be implemented until months later. In November in a beer hall in Munich,
Hitler unleashed a revolt aimed at seizing the city and Bavarian governments and then

16

Ibid., 24.
Ibid., 25.
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The German translation is Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, abbreviated as NSDAP or
Nazi.
20
The Ruhr Crisis was the occupation of Germany’s industrial region by French troops in January 1923
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overthrowing the Weimar regime in Berlin. He and his party intended to establish a new
government free from liberals, Jews, socialists, and all who had “stabbed Germany in the
back.” The police were tipped off, a number of the SA were killed, and Hitler was
arrested. During his time in jail, he wrote his autobiography, the “bible” of National
Socialism, Mein Kampf (My Struggle).
In Mein Kampf, Hitler presented his racial and anti-Semitic worldview. He
alleged that the “mingling of Aryan blood with that of lower peoples…[would]
result…[in] the end of the cultured people.”21 The “lower peoples” of whom Hitler wrote
were allegedly any persons who were not German, especially Jews and Slavs. The
“cultured people” were the one master race, supposedly the German people. He argued
that “all great cultures of the past perished only because the originally creative race died
out from blood poisoning.”22 According to Hitler, the same would happen to the Germans
if they continued to mix with the Jews and other alleged inferior peoples. The Jews, he
claimed, would infiltrate the Germanic race and the latter would eventually cease to exist.
He proposed that “those who want to live, let them fight, and those who do not want to
fight in this world of eternal struggle do not deserve to live.”23 Hitler suggested that
if at the beginning of the War and during the War, twelve
or fifteen thousand of these [Jewish] corrupters of the
people had been held under poison gas, as happened to
hundreds of thousands of our very best German [soldiers]
in the field, the sacrifice of millions at the front would not
have been in vain. On the contrary: twelve thousand [Jews]
eliminated in time might have saved the lives of a million
real Germans, valuable for the future.24
21

Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, Trans. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943), 286.
Ibid., 289.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid., 679.
22
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As Hitler had written in Mein Kampf, his associates, beginning in 1941, used poison gas
to murder large numbers of Jews and other alleged inferior peoples in death camps.
This meant Hitler believed Germany would one day have to again go to war in
order to destroy the Jews and other alleged racial enemies. Such a war was only part of
the continuous cycle of racial conflict throughout history in which the world’s races were
locked in battle for survival. War was a necessity for two reasons. The first was to
eliminate Germany’s enemies, the “lower peoples,” as rivals, namely the Jews and Slavs.
The second reason was to seize the land and resources of the “lower peoples,” which
Hitler claimed they did not deserve, for the survival of the master race and its global
domination. Only the strongest races survived.
After the onset of the world economic depression in late 1929, Hitler and the Nazi
Party gained increasing power in Germany, both at the polls and through the use of open
violence in the streets, carried out against the party’s political and other opponents by the
SA. The party went from 810,000 votes in 1928 to 6.4 million in 1930, and its numbers
elected to the Reichstag, the national parliament, soared from 12 to 107. The economic
crisis, which produced mass unemployment—some 5.6 million unemployed by 1932,
nearly 30 percent of the labor force—and suffering in Germany, discredited the Weimar
Republic even more in the eyes of many Germans. Bitter political divisions between
German communists and socialists, on the extreme left, and the Nazis, on the right, not
only prevented the democratic government from dealing effectively with the economic
disaster, but also led to near civil war between the factions in Berlin and other cities. By
1932, the SA and its subordinate Nazi paramilitary organization, the SS (Schutzstaffel,
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Protection Squads), numbered nearly a half million men. In the Reichstag election of 31
July 1932, the Nazis received 37.3 percent of the vote and won 230 seats in the
parliament, making the party the largest in Germany.
On 30 January 1933, the Weimar president, Paul von Hindenburg, Germany’s
aging field marshal and military hero from the Great War, appointed Hitler chancellor.
Hindenburg did so out of widespread fear among Germans of a Communist revolution in
the country and from pressure by conservative allies in big business and agriculture. Such
leaders, themselves traditionally anti-Semitic, revered Hitler’s extreme nationalism and
believed that, once he had become chancellor, they could control him and his political
movement. While they thought Hitler a vulgar man, a lower middle class product several
notches below them socially, they viewed him as a useful tool to fight Communism and
labor unions, rebuild the military and armaments industry, break the shackles of the hated
Versailles Treaty, and reassert German influence in world affairs reminiscent of the
German empire before the Great War.
After his appointment as chancellor, however, Hitler revealed quickly to his
conservative allies how badly they had erred in their belief that he could be controlled.
They had underestimated his political abilities, ruthlessness, and fanatical racial
nationalism. He and his party set forth not to restore the Old Order, but creat a new one
that would prepare Germany for another major war. Such a war, in Hitler’s view, would
destroy Germany’s alleged racial inferiors and rivals and leave the country—and its
supposed master race—the dominant power not only in Europe, but the world. In
preparation for his unprecedented racial and global ambitions, immediately on his

11

appointment as German chancellor on 30 January 1933, Hitler began a covet German
rearmament, seeking to conceal it from the rest of the world, especially from the Western
Powers that had fashioned the Versailles Treaty. Only two years later, in March 1935,
would his Nazi government announce publicly that German was rearming and, therefore,
violating the disarmament provisions in the treaty.
The Anglo-American Press and the Nazi Government
On 14 March 1933, Joseph Goebbels was appointed Minister for Popular
Enlightenment and Propaganda by German President Paul von Hindenburg. Included in
the propaganda ministry under Goebbels’s control was a department to deal specifically
with the press.25 Historian Ralf Reuth later explained that “the press had to be ‘a
piano…in the hands of the government,’ on which the government could play.”26 There
were many different “tunes” the Nazi government played in dealing with the foreign
press to control the press’s access to information or to influence what the press reported.
Historian Deborah Lipstadt later explained that the German government had
“suggested that certain…correspondents in Germany be rewarded and others more
severely censored or expelled.”27 Journalist William Shirer described several examples of
journalists being rewarded in his memoirs, The Berlin Diary. He wrote that some foreign
reporters received invitations to meet personally with Hitler for breakfast. Shirer recalled
one occasion in which he was invited to Hermann Göring’s wedding.28 Rewards such as

25

Ralf Reuth, Goebbels (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1993), 172-173.
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these allowed the foreign press “to maintain cordial contacts with German authorities.”29
These contacts allowed the foreign press to have access to information it might not
otherwise have. However, because of the sources, one would have to question the validity
of such information. Additionally, personal acquaintanceship with Nazi officials would
likely make the press more sympathetic toward the Nazi government. Such sympathies
existed among the press. Shirer noted that the national British newspaper, The Daily
Mail, was sympathetic toward the Nazi government. He wrote that “Lord Rothermere, its
owner, and Ward Price, its roving correspondent—both pro-Nazi—has become a
wonderful Nazi mouthpiece and sounding-board.”30
The foreign press also faced the threat of expulsion by the German government.
In November 1934, several months prior to Hitler’s March 1935 announcement of
rearmament and conscription, Shirer wrote in his memoirs that there was “much talk here
that Germany is secretly arming, though it is difficult to get definite dope, and if you did
get it and sent it, you’d probably be expelled.”31 Threats of expulsion or imprisonment
deterred journalists from reporting news entirely or made them censor what they
reported. Lipstadt later explained that “expulsion was not a badge of honor for foreign
correspondents. They were quite anxious to avoid it because they were never ‘sure [their]
newspapers would understand’ or forgive them if they were forced to leave.”32

29
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In a diary entry dated 29 January 1942, Goebbels wrote that “propaganda must
therefore always be essentially simple and repetitious.”33 According to Reuth, the “chief
instrument for steering the press [was the] press conference of the Reich government”34
for the delivery of the “simple and repetitious” propaganda message of the Reich.
Goebbels frequently attended and participated in these conferences, which were held
daily at noon with journalists selected by the Nazi government. In addition to the press
conference, the foreign press received “the official ‘directives’ and ‘instructions’ [from
the Nazi government]. Editors also received ‘confidential information’ from the NSDAP
press secretary’s office.”35
Shirer attended one of these press conferences. He recalled he had received a
telephone call requesting his presence only two hours prior to the beginning of the
conference. He wrote that “when I got there about a hundred foreign correspondents were
crowded into the conference room…none knowing why we had been convoked. Finally,
Goebbels limped in.…He began immediately to read in a loud voice the text.”36 When the
press conference concluded, Shirer noted that “two or three officials remained to answer
questions, but it was plain they were afraid to say any more than was contained in the
official communiqué.”37 Through the press conferences and press releases, the Nazi
government disseminated the information it wanted to the foreign press. However, as
Shirer revealed, there was “more than was contained in the official communiqué.” The

33
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press conferences and releases were propaganda, and the foreign press seemed aware of
that.
If the Nazi government was not releasing information to the press, the
government withheld information it deemed detrimental to the Reich’s image. For
example, in a 19 February 1942 diary entry, Goebbels wrote that he “preferred to hold
back things like that,”38 in reference to a report detailing an assassination plan on Hitler’s
life. He explained that “in wartime one should not speak of assassination,”39 especially
since this was an assassination against the Reich leadership. Germany or its leadership
could not appear vulnerable. Controlling the information relayed to the press protected
the image of Germany.
The final tactic the German government used to control the foreign press was by
attempting to discredit foreign journalists. Lipstadt later explained that the Nazi
government often tried “to reinforce…confusion”40 among the press. Confusion existed
because the Berlin claimed that particular events “never happened; second, [the events]
will be investigated; third [the events] will never happen again.”41 Confusion made
accurate reporting difficult because there was uncertainty as to what exactly had
happened. It was difficult to know what to report. Other attempts to discredit the press
included “the Nazis repeatedly accus[ing] reporters of lying.”42 As a result, Lisptadt
explained “there was a question of the truthfulness of the reports.”43
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On 19 May 1942, Goebbels wrote that he believed “the Americans and English
fall easily for…propaganda.”44 The Nazi government attempted to control the press’s
access to information or influence what was reported in many different ways. In some
cases, this worked, but, more often than not, the foreign journalists realized they were
being duped, and the Anglo-American press was overall accurate in its reporting on
Germany’s rearmament.
Purpose of Study/Research Objectives
How successful was Hitler in keeping Nazi Germany’s initial rearmament
between January 1933 and March 1935 secret from the rest of the world? What did the
world know about such activities? The Nazi government permitted numerous foreign
newsmen to continue working in Germany, including those from the major American and
British newspapers and magazines. What did such journalists and their papers know, and
report to their audiences in the United States and Britain about the fledgling German
rearmament?
This study will examine the Anglo-American press coverage of Germany’s secret
rearmament between 1933 and 1935, with the aim of pursuing three main objectives:
1. Describe the rearmament process occurring in Germany and how it related to or
influenced the country’s position in international affairs.
2. Investigate the accuracy and objectivity of Anglo-American press coverage of
the German rearmament. This goal will be achieved by analyzing and comparing
information from several major American and British newspapers and magazines from

44
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1933 to 1935 with data gleaned from the principal secondary sources on Nazi
rearmament and foreign policy.
3. Determine how Hitler was perceived in the Anglo-American world, whether as
a peace-loving statesman, which he repeatedly emphasized that he was in public in his
first years in power, or as a potential threat to Europe and world peace. An analysis of the
major British and American media will provide an indication of whether it and its
newsmen in Germany deemed Hitler a threat. The press played a significant role, on this
news issue as on most others, in shaping public opinion in both the United States and
Britain.
Primary Sources and Historiography
Primary Sources—Newspapers
The newspapers used are The New York Times, The Times (London), The
Washington Post, and The Manchester Guardian. Newspaper reports will provide a broad
perspective on what was known and significant about Nazi covert rearmament. The
amount and depth of coverage, or lack thereof, of rearmament will indicate the
significance of the issue. Articles from The New York Times, The Times (London), and
The Washington Post were selected after searches of their respective indices. The
Manchester Guardian had no index of articles. Materials from The Manchester Guardian
were selected by exhaustingly examining each individual edition archived on microfilm.
The New York Times was founded in September 1851 by Henry Raymond.
Raymond, born in New York in 1820, was well educated and began his career as a
teacher. By the late 1830s and early 1840s, Raymond became a journalist. From his
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personal savings and that of investors, Raymond founded The New York Times.45 With
his death in 1869, ownership of the paper changed hands to George Jones. The paper
continued to expand and grow under his leadership and earned the reputation of telling a
“story...in [a] dignified, newsy fashion, without trimmings…[in] a consistently even
way.”46 In 1896, The New York Times was acquired by Adolph Ochs, a German
immigrant who was a businessman and newspaper tycoon.47 Ochs operated his
newspaper on the principle of “giv[ing] straight news as fast as any other sheet or
faster.”48
By the outbreak of the Great War, “The Times was already firmly established as a
newspaper of record.”49 The newspaper had reporters imbedded throughout Europe to
provide international coverage of the war. Despite its efforts to remain impartial in its
war coverage, The Times received criticism because its owner was German.50 Frederick
Birchall served as The Times’ chief European correspondent when Hitler became the
chancellor of Germany in 1933. Birchall was described as “writ[ing] so bluntly in that
period…with equally forthright reporting.”51 However, most Americans were
preoccupied with the Great Depression and “had little thought for the rapid spread of
Hitlerism.”52
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In 1877, journalist and businessman Stilson Hutchins published the first edition of
The Washington Post. Hutchins sought to create a “first-rate newspaper…for intelligent
comments upon the current topics of the time [for] the Washington public.”53 The
Washington Post prospered from the start because it “reported politics…across the
nation,…it wrote about politics in a cynical and knowing, but entertaining way,…[and
finally] it covered foreign news.”54 Hutchins sold the newspaper in 1889 to Frank Hatton,
a Civil War veteran, government official, and journalist, and Beriah Wilkins, a banker
and former state senator from Ohio. Under the leadership of Hutchins and Wilkins The
Post continued to expand and became a “newspaper of record” because of the extensive
coverage of “national and international news…[that] dominated the paper’s columns.”55
However, throughout the Great War, The Post came under scrutiny because it
“relied largely on AP dispatches ‘for its news from the front.’”56 John McLean, owner of
The Post since 1905, had wanted to “keep out of the war—but profit from it.”57
Additionally, The Post’s position on the Great War was inconsistent, encouraging
Americans to remain neutral at times, while other times informing citizens to be prepared
to take up arms.58 For these reasons, the newspaper’s coverage of international affairs
suffered. The shift in news coverage to the domestic scene continued throughout the
1930. Reporters with The Post focused on “the economic relief of Americans and
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recovery of their national fortunes.”59 When Hitler became chancellor of Germany in
1933, The Post’s editorial board wrote it was against the “extreme nationalism” in
Germany but did not favor any intervention from the United States or other European
nations. However, with Hitler’s announcement of German rearmament in March 1935,
the editorial board believed “the only ultimate alternative…to acceptance of German
equality is another war designed completely to destroy and dismember that nation. And
that would involve collapse of the remainder of European civilization.”60
British businessman John Walter founded The Daily Universal Register in 1785.
With the establishment of his newspaper, Walter hoped to make an “essential
improvement in the conduct of the press…[from] great incorrectness, to a system…[that]
will meet the public approbation and countenance.”61 On 1 January 1788, The Daily
Universal Register became known as The Times (London).62 In the early 1800s, it
expanded nationally after receiving financial support from the British government.63 As
circulation and finances increased, the newspaper became independent and acquired a
reputation as being “identified with the middle classes, the commercial interests, the
stock exchange and the manufacturers, and increasingly hostile to…government.”64 The
Times (London) also began devoting “urgent interest” to foreign coverage.65
Prior to the Great War during the tumultuous summer of 1914, The Times
(London) tried to maintain good relations with the German imperial government.
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Additionally, the newspaper believed that “Britain’s role was to mediate” any conflict.66
Throughout the Great War, “the commentators of The Times…felt that their task was to
sustain the morale of the nation in mortal combat: therefore, they praised victories no less
highly than they deserved; in stalemates they found elements of advantage; and defeats
they minimized, excused or ignored.”67 Circulation dropped and critical British citizens
claimed the newspaper was “regarded as a government organ.”68
“The first leading article, ‘Herr Hitler in Office,’…discussed the change of
chancellor as a normal event in German internal politics”69 when it was printed in the 30
January 1933 edition of The Times (London). Articles about Germany appearing later in
the newspaper cited “the fall in unemployment, and remarked…the enthusiasm that the
Nazi leaders could evoke.”70 The Times (London) began to be considered sympathetic
towards Hitler and the Nazi regime.71 Most of the editorial board and reporters believed
“Germany had been unjustly treated by the Versailles peace treaty, and her grievances
should be resolved.”72 They were “impressed by Germany’s professions and promises”
and encouraged “pacificism [towards Germany] and revisionism [of the Versailles
Treaty].”73
The Manchester Guardian, founded by businessman and journalist John Taylor,
began publication as a weekly newspaper on 5 May 1821. Taylor wanted a newspaper
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devoted to the politics and economy of the working-class Manchester area.74 This was
especially important to him “in the aftermath of the Peterloo Massacre and the growing
campaign to repeal the Corn Laws.”75 While The Guardian reported sufficiently on the
Manchester area, national and international news came from other newspapers
throughout the 1800s.76 This meant that “foreign news was…often sadly delayed…[and]
months old.”77
In 1907 Guardian editor Charles Scott purchased the newspaper from the Taylor
family. Scott expanded the newspaper from a regional newspaper to a truly national
one.78 When the Great War began in 1914, The Guardian began using international
correspondents and reporters for covering the war on the continent. The management and
editorial board had realized that “‘quality’ newspapers…had [their] own special
sources…[and] staff correspondents overseas.”79 As a result, if The Guardian were to
compete, its international reporting staff had to expand, and by 1919 “it began to build up
its own regular group of full-time men for key places.”80
During the 1930s, The Guardian’s European reporters “interpreted what they saw
in terms first of that country [in which they were stationed] and secondly in terms of its
impact on Europe as a whole.”81 The reporting on Germany was “rather less about the
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effect of Hitler’s revolution on Germany’s foreign policy and rather more about its effect
on Germans.”82
Primary Sources—Magazines and Periodicals
Relevant magazine and other periodical articles were selected using The Readers’
Guide to Periodical Literature and The International Index of Periodicals
Writing in 1975 about the history of magazines, mass media analyst Theodore
Peterson observed that “the life of a magazine on the newsstands was short. Therefore,
publishers were guided by the habits of the reading public.”83 This meant that popular
magazines primarily tried to provide what readers were interested in at the time. Articles
would be special features that were of interest to readers and that complemented the
regular daily news reports. Articles were more in-depth than typical news reports or had
more thorough analysis of their subject.
The magazine and periodical publishing industry changed after the Great War
because of the increasing complexity and fast pace of the world. Peterson believed “the
new kinds of magazines that arose were the products of their times.”84 As a result, the
beginning of the news magazine and the digest magazine occurred during the post-Great
War period. Its purpose was “to sift the glut of news, to put it into convenient
compartments, and to tell the hurried reader what it meant.”85 Digest magazines were
meant to inform busy readers also. Peterson explained that digest magazines “tried to
distill, in simple language, the vast outpourings of busy presses for the reader on the
82
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run.”86 The magazines were meant to give readers the news quickly so they could keep up
with the quickening pace of society. Magazine and periodical articles typically featured
that particular week’s news summary or provided supplemental in-depth material on the
major news events of that week.
Since Hitler first became a political figure in the early 1920s, he was reported on
substantially in American and British magazines and periodicals. Historian Michael
Zalampas remarked that “Americans were well served by coverage given to Adolf Hitler,
the Nazi Party, and the Third Reich in their magazines.”87 Zalampas’s research revealed
that magazines and periodicals “never embraced appeasement at any price, never allowed
themselves to be subverted by Nazi ideology, and never supported Hitler.”88
Historiography
Two excellent surveys exist on German rearmament that were used in this study.
The first is Covert German Rearmament, 1919-1939 by Bart Whaley. Whaley’s work
began as an investigation for the Central Intelligence Agency and was later turned into a
book. His text “examines four separate phases in this process of [armament]
evasion…[and] German-Soviet military collaboration.”89 Whaley argued that “arms
evasions…proceed[ed] under the thinnest of cover stories.”90 He concluded that German
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rearmament proceeded with little intervention from the Allies because “the Allied
motives [were] masked by that [of] apathy.”91
The second survey is The Pipe Dream of Peace: The Story of the Collapse of
Disarmament by John Wheeler-Bennett. Wheeler-Bennett produced “an account of the
General Disarmament Conference,”92 covering the period from February 1932 until
August 1934. Wheeler-Bennett interpreted the Disarmament Conference to be a “tragic
[story]…because of its record of opportunities missed and genuinely well-meant
intentions misunderstood.”93 While many European politicians and statesmen believed
that the Great War had ushered in a new order in Europe, Wheeler-Bennett believed
“nothing had really changed” and that there was “bitterness” and a lack of
“understanding” at the Disarmament Conference.94 He claimed that “the Allies continued
to treat it [Germany] as though it were composed of the most dangerous Prussian
warlords.”95 German statesmen repeatedly “assured us [the Allies] that it needed only a
gesture of understanding…[to become] a new state of which Europe might be proud.”
However, many political observers warned that “attempting to keep Germany
permanently in subjection must inevitably end in national revolution and all that that
implied.”96 Wheeler-Bennett concluded that those “warnings fell upon deaf ears.”97
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Historian Hans Gatzke described the process of German rearmament during
Chancellor and Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann’s time in office in the 1920s. Gatzke
argued in Stresemann and the Rearmament of Germany that “the rearmament of the
Reichswehr had to be a secret…yet it would be wrong to conclude from this emphasis on
secrecy, that the violations of…Versailles…were carried on exclusively …behind the
back or against the protest of Germany’s civilian authorities.”98 He went on to explain
that Stresemann was instrumental in the rearmament process during the 1920s and gave
the full support of the Weimar government to it.99
Other students may want to consult German Rearmament and the West, 19321933 by Edward Bennett. The scope of his text was “German military planning in the
early 1930s.”100 His point was that if one wanted “a knowledge of German
intentions…[then] it seems essential to establish the nature of German arms plans and
preparations.” Bennett concluded that “military leaders sought from early on to restore
the nation’s military strength as a means of revising the peace settlement.” This would
allow Germany to threaten war as a means of strengthening diplomacy. Bennett also
noted that France opposed Germany’s ambitions of rearmament, while the British,
however, practiced a policy of appeasement.101 Without the support of the British, France
remained virtually isolated. Finally, Bennett believed “the advocates of disarmament
tended to take German demands for equality at face value, and they overlooked the basic
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incompatibility between the dominant German view of the way the world should be and
the views of the other nations.”102 As a result, Germany was able to rearm.
In The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe,
1933-1936, historian Gerhard Weinberg explored “the course and development of
German foreign policy in the National Socialist era” and how it allowed “Germany’s
determination for war [to become] the central issue in world diplomacy.”103 Weinberg
noted the Allies had imposed the Versailles Treaty to restrict and weaken Germany, but
the treaty had done nothing to strengthen the Allies from their suffering in the Great War.
Weinberg argued that “Germany had emerged from the World War relatively at least as
powerful if not more powerful than when it entered the conflict, with its erstwhile
enemies relatively weaker.”104 These were two different perceptions of how things really
were in Germany and in Europe.
Hitler was also significant in the development of German foreign policy.
Weinberg wrote that “Hitler developed a personal style of government that was clear in
its ends but entirely flexible in its means and instruments. Whatever and whoever could
deliver the goods was fine with him.”105 Most significant to Hitler was “the rearmament
of Germany which would enable it to move forward by threat or by force.”106 Weinberg
concluded that Hitler “[took] advantage of the love of peace and fear of war in other
countries…[and] he built up Germany’s strength to the point where others could no

102

Ibid., 511.
Gerhard Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany: Diplomatic Revolution in Europe, 19331936 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), x-xi.
104
Ibid., 358.
105
Ibid., 359.
106
Ibid.
103

27

longer contemplate war as an answer to German aggression except as a most dangerous
undertaking.”107
Several studies about the specific branches of the German military have been
included. Wilhelm Deist noted in The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament that “the
German Army had, of course, never been willing to accept the Versailles Treaty.”108 His
text covers the rearmament process the German army undertook throughout the 1930s
with the assistance of the Nazi government prior to Hitler’s announcement of rearmament
in 1935. The German navy received attention in Carl-Axel Gemzell’s Organization,
Conflict, and Innovation: A Study of German Naval Strategic Planning, 1888-1940.
While broad chronologically, Gemzell gave adequate coverage to the 1920s and 1930s as
the navy began to rebuild. It was during this period that the German government stressed
“the importance of mobile and flexible naval warfare”109 for future conflicts and
supported rearmament efforts. James Corum described the rearmament process of the
German air force in The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War: 1918-1940.
Corum explained that “the years 1933-1936 were of foundation-building”110 for the
rearmament of the air force, and had a “limited rearmament program.”111
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Closing Remarks
Through the use of primary and secondary sources, this study will examine the
Anglo-American press coverage of Germany’s “secret” rearmament under the leadership
of Adolf Hitler from the time he became chancellor in January 1933 until he announced
publicly in March 1935 that Germany would rearm. This program of “secret”
rearmament, begun in the early 1920s, and continued under Hitler’s watch, would enable
Hitler to take Germany to war in 1939 with the world.
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CHAPTER TWO
30 JANUARY 1933 TO 14 OCTOBER 1933

The Beginning of the Hitler Regime
On 30 January 1933, when Adolf Hitler became the chancellor of Germany, the
International Disarmament Conference was in session at Geneva, Switzerland. Begun on
2 February 1932, the conference was chaired by Arthur Henderson, former British
foreign secretary. The purpose of the conference was to discuss the issue of disarmament
among nations, particularly in light of Germany’s demands of equality of armaments. The
Germans believed that they deserved to rearm to the levels of other European nations
despite limitations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. Additionally, the Germans
demanded that if they were not allowed to rearm, then other European nations should
disarm to the levels that were imposed on Germany.112 These demands of equality
dominated the conference throughout 1932 and 1933.
Once Hitler became chancellor of Germany, the issue over German armaments
became all the more serious.113 The Great War was a recent memory for most Europeans,
and they feared another Great War. The Versailles Treaty was designed to prevent
Germany from ever starting or waging another war. Now, with Hitler in power and his
demand for armament equality and radical ideas of “race and space,” armaments became
a serious issue.
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On 31 January 1933, The Times (London) and The Manchester Guardian reported
on Hitler’s ascension to power. Both articles described briefly Hitler’s appointment as
chancellor by the president of Germany, Paul von Hindenburg. Neither one of these
articles made the front page. This was surprising considering Hitler had been politically
active since the early 1920s and such major international news should merit the front
page. Perhaps Hitler was underestimated or his appointment unexpected, which made this
just another news story. The articles listed the appointments Hitler made to fill cabinet
positions, noting only the ministry of the interior and the commissioner for aviation were
filled by Nazi party members Wilhelm Frick and Hermann Göring, respectively.114 Then
The Times article stated that “foreign opinion is of secondary importance with the
attitude…of the German people towards their new Government.”115 The Hitler regime
was “on the whole greeted with enthusiasm.”116 The Times’s wait-and-see approach to the
new Hitler regime contrasted with that of the Manchester Guardian which questioned
whether Jews had a future in Germany, because of the Nazis’ anti-Semitism and whether
Hitler would “seek to redress crudely and sensationally the injustices of Versailles.”117
The Manchester Guardian’s fears about the future of Jews in Germany and whether
Hitler would “redress…the injustices of Versailles” would prove correct. Hitler met with
several of his generals on 3 February 1933 and, in a speech, revealed his plans which
included the
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extermination of Marxism root and branch [and the] adjustment of youth
and of the whole people to the idea that only a struggle can save us and
that everything else must be subordinated....[Germany must] battle against
Versailles.…[The battle includes] the building up of the armed forces…for
achieving the goal of regaining political power. National Service must be
reintroduced….Living space [is] too small for [the] German people….The
conquest of new living space in the east and its ruthless Germanization
[must occur because it is] certain that only through political power and
struggle can the present economic circumstances be changed.118
The American journal, Foreign Affairs, believed Hitler was already redressing
“the injustices of Versailles.” The publication noted that the armament limitations in the
Treaty of Versailles were supposed to limit the strength and effectiveness of the German
army.119 However, Germany had a “number of machine guns; a reserve of rifles…[and]
infantry and artillery munitions”120 of “forbidden weapons.” During the mid-1920s, the
Germans had begun designing, manufacturing, and testing various weapons and their
accessories. Krupp, one of Germany’s largest armaments and industrial manufacturing
companies, began to produce various parts for the submarine. Krupp also designed early
forms of rockets. As early as 1928, tanks were being manufactured.121 Many of the newly
manufactured arms underwent “artillery test firing…in 1929.”122 Foreign Affairs asserted
that the Germans had a police force sufficiently maintained and trained that it could
become easily a part of the Reichswehr, the German army.123 By 1933, there were an
estimated 400,000 SA troops. The report in Foreign Affairs concluded that “Germany at
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this moment could put in the field an army totally unlike that provided for in the
Treaty”124 of comparable or greater strength than that of other European nations.
In February 1933, the international community learned that the Hitler regime was
training reserve forces through its Volunteer Labor Corps and had begun to explore the
possibility of creating an air force. The Times reported that German Major-General
Wilhelm von Faupel spoke at a Labor Corps meeting and said the training of young men
in the organization was good for “the schooling of the mind,…the interests of
comradeship,…[with] the ideal of serving the Fatherland.”125 The idea of reserve training
appealed to many young men for several reasons. Most of them liked the idea of
structure, order, and power that came with military training. Other young men liked “the
vague idealism and its talk of ‘renewal’ and ‘rebirth’”126 that serving the Fatherland
entailed. For others, service provided an employment opportunity during hard economic
times. The Times estimated that about 40,000 such men were trained annually. The total
number of men who had been trained by 1933 was about 250,000.127 The Times was
rather liberal in its estimate. About 85,000 men had been recruited for reserve training.128
Many onlookers from the international community believed that when Hitler’s
loyal Nazi Party and government official Hermann Göring became the aviation

124

Ibid., 244.
“Young Men in Uniform,” The Times (London), 2 February 1933, 9.
126
Kitchen, 281-282.
127
“Young Men in Uniform,” 9.
128
Wilhelm Deist, The Wehrmacht and German Rearmament (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981),
29.
125

33

commissioner “a movement of militarization in the air”129 had begun. On 2 February,
Göring explained in a speech that Germany wanted peace, but such peace depended on
other European nations and whether or not they allowed Germany to have armaments
equality. He believed that such equality and developing an aviation ministry were
necessary for German security.130 Göring, a distinguished air force flyer in the Great War,
was the perfect man for the job of developing an aviation ministry and air force. He was
able to impress upon Hitler the importance of air armaments and secure substantial
funding for the financing of them because of his position and close relationship with
Hitler.131 The Times correctly reported this significant news that Germany was laying the
foundation for aerial rearmament.
While the Versailles Treaty had prohibited completely German military aviation,
prior to 1933 Reichswehr leaders had kept up with the latest technological developments
in the area and obtained all desired test results. This had been achieved by transferring
aircraft production abroad (most significantly, in the 1920s, to Russia), cooperating
closely with civil aviation, especially the German airline Lufthansa, and finally by
training officers as pilots and observers in friendly foreign countries. By spring 1933,
however, the number of airplanes fit for military action was small.132
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Hitler continued to emphasize Germany’s position on armaments equality
throughout February in several speeches covered in the press. He reiterated that Germany
wanted peace and that other nations should disarm, but not Germany.133 Hitler, as well as
many Germans, made this claim because German disarmament “had originally been
intended as a prelude to the general disarmament thought necessary for peace.”134 The
other European powers had to disarm as well. In a speech on 12 February, Hitler became
increasingly aggressive in his demands when he verbally attacked France. Wire reports to
The New York Times revealed that Hitler claimed “Germany will increase her armaments
unless France disarms.”135 Onlookers explained Hitler’s “impatience,” “rashness,” and
“frankness” were directed clearly towards the French to push the issue of German
armaments equality.136 The French were alarmed with Hitler’s rhetoric as memories of
the Great War were still fresh from when Germany invaded France.
Such issues were discussed at the Disarmament Conference. The Economist, a
British political magazine, summarized the British delegation’s proposal that all
European nations should pursue eventually “equality of war material and for a
standardization of the organization of Continental European armies.”137 The British based
the success of their plan on the hope that France would disarm and thus appease the
Germans so that they would not rearm. This would create a balance of power that the
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British proposed just as The Economist had described.138 This publication also reported
that the Treaty of Versailles and other such treaties were still binding until matters could
be fully discussed.139 The delegation’s proposals were further expounded upon and
discussed in The Manchester Guardian. It featured articles which stated that the French
delegation questioned logistical issues concerning the standardization of Continental
armies. The French believed that there was no way to define standardization because
criteria such as training, length of service, reserves, and the use of police forces in the
army had not been addressed. After debate, the French proposed that army
standardization include service lengths under a year and limited effectiveness, but these
were not defined.140 The French conceded because they desired an alliance with Britain.
The French were still haunted by the German attack in the Great War.141
The discussions at the conference were not limited to ground forces. The British
delegation pushed for “the suppression of all war aviation”142 while the French sought
“international boards of control [for aviation] and the ownership of civil aircraft under the
League.”143 Even though Germany’s demands for armaments equality had not been
achieved, Hitler’s attitude changed abruptly. A journalist with the Associated Press
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reported Hitler was “willing to go to any lengths to further the ideal of disarmament.”144
Surprisingly, this included the elimination of the German army.145
German Threats and European Fears
The impression that the Germans were appeased was illusory. By the beginning of
March 1933, the major Anglo-American newspapers had reported that the British and the
French became alarmed when Rudolf Nadolny, chair of the German delegation to the
Disarmament Conference, threatened that Germany would withdraw from the
conference.146 Because the German demands of armaments equality had not been met,
Nadolny believed “the conference has been ineffective,”147 and he made his threat. Even
the British and French delegations began to doubt the effectiveness of the conference.
The British delegation proposed to adjourn until a later date in an attempt to ease some of
the tensions while the French delegation believed the present discussions at the
conference were “a sheer waste of time.”148
In an attempt to save the conference, British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald
traveled to Geneva to resolve the crisis. He agreed with Nadolny’s statements because the
conference had not done its job. MacDonald was attempting to take control of the
situation.149 Upon arrival at the conference, he sought to “determine whether any concrete
arms reduction could be effected,”150 yet little progress was made. Exactly as the four

144

“Hitler Favors Disarmament For All World,” The Washington Post, 23 February 1933,1.
Ibid.
146
“Arms Parley Near Failure, Is Report,” The Washington Post, 4 March 1933, 5; “Drifting at Geneva,”
The Times (London), 4 March 1933, 11.
147
“Arms Parley Near Failure,” 5.
148
“Complete Deadlock at Geneva,” The Manchester Guardian, 8 March 1933, 9.
149
“Premier’s Coming Visit to Geneva,” The Manchester Guardian, 4 March 1933, 16.
150
“MacDonald Studies Dark Arms Picture,” The Washington Post, 12 March 1933, 1.
145

37

major Anglo-American newspapers had reported, the limited progress made when
MacDonald encountered the German delegation and its threat of withdrawal proved to be
“discouraging” and “disappointing.”151
On 12 March, Göring spoke again at the conference. The already tense situation
was not helped. He threatened “to use every effort to restore Germany to her place in the
air.”152 In his highly emotional speech, Göring alleged that the European nations at the
Disarmament Conference were enemies of Germany and attempted to suppress German
power. He claimed they would be unable to restrict Germany, and Germany would return
to the air even if that meant war.153 Not long after Göring’s speech, MacDonald offered
his plan for disarmament. Both The Times and Washington Post reported accurately that
MacDonald proposed a reduction in armaments for the French and an increase in
armaments for the Germans. The Germans were permitted to have a land army of
200,000 troops while the French were reduced to the newly proposed level of the
Germans. The Germans were allowed to maintain a naval force as well as an air force.
Aerial bombing as well as chemical and biological warfare were forbidden in
MacDonald’s new proposal, which was to be in effect for the next five years.154
In an analysis of MacDonald’s proposal, an article in The Spectator, a British
magazine, explained “the proposals have been well received”155 by the Germans, but
there was still considerable work to be done. The piece described the proposals as merely
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a “compromise” to appease the Germans temporarily and prevent total failure of the
Disarmament Conference. MacDonald even acknowledged the proposals were a
compromise; however, claims that “the proposals have been well received” were false.
The Germans remained anxious and skeptical of the British plan, while even British
public opinion was affected in “an adverse way.”156 It was likely difficult to gauge
opinion as quickly as The Spectator had done. The politicians and the public had not had
sufficient time to consider the proposals and their long-term consequences. Logistical
issues about the naval armaments and how to limit continental armies had to be discussed
still. The solution the magazine offered to solve the armaments crisis was for French
Premier Édouard Daladier, Italian Prime Minister Benito Mussolini, and Hitler to take a
more active role in negotiations at the Disarmament Conference as British Prime Minister
MacDonald had done.157 The issue over armaments was hardly resolved.
For the time being, tensions about armaments seemed to be quelled, but only until
the Germans launched several naval vessels, which received some coverage in The New
York Times. The first few days of April 1933 were marked with celebration by the
Germans with the dedication of “Germany’s second ‘pocket battleship’…named Admiral
Scheer in memory of the late commander of the German fleet.”158 The Admiral Scheer
was described as being “heavily armed” and able to outrun battleships. As early as 1927,
German naval vessels were being designed to travel at greater speeds and to be armed
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more heavily.159 The Admiral Scheer’s design was nothing new and reporters for The
New York Times should not have been as alarmed at this allegedly “new” design when the
ship was dedicated. During the dedication ceremony, Germany’s minister of defense,
General Werner von Blomberg, denounced the Treaty of Versailles and insisted that the
Germans wanted peace and security.160 Shortly after the dedication ceremony, an
Associated Press report revealed that the Germans had already begun construction of a
third naval cruiser in late 1932 and would begin construction on a fourth cruiser in late
1934. Additionally, the Germans planned to build “four reserve destroyers…between
1934 and 1936.”161 While there was considerable alarm in The New York Times over the
construction of the Admiral Scheer and future ships, these vessels had been planned and
known about since the mid-1920s, when the German government approved construction
to replace aging vessels.162 Nevertheless, the navy’s 13,900 non-commissioned officers
and men and its 1,100 officers did not even have the ships permitted Germany by the
Treaty of Versailles. The Germans had nearly reached the limit for lighter ships, like
cruisers and torpedo-boats, but replacing obsolete battleships of the pre-Great War era
with modern pocket battleships, like the Admiral Scheer, had only just begun.163
The major Anglo-American newspapers then reported the French delegation had
begun to demand revisions to the armaments proposals that British Prime Minister
MacDonald had made the previous month. The French government knew that
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MacDonald’s proposals had been made to continue the Disarmament Conference and
keep the Germans from withdrawing. The French believed that it was time to resume
discussions and to revise the proposals to both disarm Germany and ensure that France
“would be given a fair deal.”164 Daladier and French foreign minister Joseph PaulBoncour both agreed that MacDonald’s proposals were only the beginning but would not
be the final armaments agreement.165 The French parliament backed Daladier’s demands
with a vote of confidence “on how the peace and disarmament problems must be
approached.”166 Towards the end of April, the Disarmament Conference resumed.
The Times reported that the British delegation remained optimistic that the
reconvening Disarmament Conference would be a success, contrary to the doubtful
British public, who thought the conference would lead to nothing but continued debate.167
Indeed, on 24 and 25 April, the conference resumed with difficulty. Immediately, the
German delegation began to make demands. The Germans wanted to possess a variety of
arms for “defensive” purposes, and they thought that German forces stationed outside of
Germany should not be included in the count of home army strength. The Times noted
correctly that Nadolny tried to force the new demands at the conference. He spent over a
week trying to get the conference to “move rapidly on through a first reading”168 of the
German amendments.
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Both The New York Times and The Times reported that one of the major issues at
the conference was whether or not semi-military forces, such as the SA, counted as part of
Germany’s military force.169 This issue was significant because of the increasing
prominence of, and brutality inflicted on Germans by, the SA in its terrorizing of Nazi
opponents. On 20 April 1933, a feature article in The Manchester Guardian described
how the SA was waging “a war of extermination… against the entire ‘Left.’”170 The SA
robbed, tortured, beat, imprisoned, and even killed enemies of the Hitler regime. The SA
had indeed become increasingly violent in the weeks after the 5 March vote for Reichstag
elections, in which the Nazi Party failed to win a majority of seats in the parliament.
After the elections, there were numerous reports of beatings, looting, and murders,171 just
as The Manchester Guardian had discussed. The SA merited such newsworthy attention
because of the danger it posed to the civil rights of Germans. The SA skirted the law and
was ignored by local police forces and the judiciary. Despite the alleged “secrecy” and
fear of the SA in Germany, news of this semi-military force of the Hitler regime could no
longer “be kept secret, either in Germany or abroad.”172 Because of the danger the SA
posed in acting frequently on behalf of the German government, the French pushed for
the SA to be included in “computing the size of the army of the Reich”173 at the
Disarmament Conference.
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In May 1933, the Disarmament Conference would decide whether or not to count
the SA as part of the German military. This decision received major news coverage in the
Anglo-American newspapers. Despite the French argument that the SA was militarily
trained and an active force, the verdict at the conference was that the SA was not a
military force and would not be counted with the German army’s numbers.174 While the
four national Anglo-American newspapers were correct in their reporting, what was not
covered was the political reason the French wanted the SA counted. The French were
tired of being accused by Nadolny of not disarming and fulfilling their obligation to do
so.175 In an attempt to appease the angry and highly critical French, the British
delegation proposed “a fixed quota of militarized police in proportion to the number of its
effectives according to an agreed percentage.”176 The Germans agreed eventually with the
British proposal on the condition of “universal acceptance” by other nations.177
Despite the disarmament conference’s decision not to consider the SA part of the
German army, the French were correct in claiming that it should do so. Unknown to the
outside world and the Anglo-American press, the integration of the paramilitary
organization into Germany’s national defense establishment represented already in early
1933 the most significant aspect of the fledgling Nazi remilitarization of the nation. As
shown by numerous military historians, the SA became an indispensable instrument of
military policy for Hitler as well as for the Reichswehr; the latter viewed the SA as a
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primary reservoir of urgently needed army reservists. According to the German historian,
Wilhelm Deist, for German army leaders “the SA was the accepted instrument of
remilitarization….In the first months of National Socialist rule the SA assumed functions
which permitted the Reichswehr to preserve the fiction of its own aloofness from
domestic political conflicts.” However, as Deist also notes, and as will be made clear
later, the SA’s use as a crucial force of army reservists “created very real dangers.” The
SA and its commander Captain Ernst Röhm, had military ambitions that would eventually
involve themselves in a conflict with Hitler as well as with the Reichswehr leadership.178
The New York Times explained that the German delegation continued to push the
issue of armaments equality. This time the delegation demanded that other nations
eliminate military aircraft and naval vessels since Germany had to reduce such aircraft
and naval vessels under the Versailles Treaty. The delegation threatened that if other
nations did not disarm, then Germany was within every right to begin manufacturing air
craft, submarines, and other naval vessels.179 Political onlookers believed the German
delegation made its demands to serve as a distraction so that Germany could begin
construction on a new naval ship and secure a spot at the planed 1935 naval conference
that would review the naval restrictions in the Versailles Treaty.180 That new German
ship referred to in The New York Times was likely the Scharnhorst, which was funded for
construction in May 1933 and launched in October 1936.181
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Both The Times and The Manchester Guardian reported that the German
delegation managed to delay the resumed Geneva proceedings when it began to make
demands concerning air and naval armaments. Little was accomplished during the next
several days. The Germans refused to discuss the German home army and the previous
proposed issue concerning the standardization of all continental armies.182 The French
delegation, which was fed-up with the Germans, demanded that the British conclude
talking and negotiating with the Germans and vote on military strength and effectives.183
The impatience of the French that was reported in The Times and The Manchester
Guardian was understandable. The British delegation wanted to continue discussions and
even considered calling a five-power meeting of the United States, France, Italy,
Germany, and, of course, the British.184 Only a few days after the resumption of the
Disarmament Conference, it had reached a deadlock and the British and French
delegations were increasingly pessimistic. There was fear that the German delegation
might withdraw from the conference as the Germans refused to accept the vote that
counted the SA in with the army to calculate military size. Negotiations and conversations
between the British and German delegations ceased.185
In a speech on 15 May, Franz von Papen, the German vice chancellor, defended
Germany’s stance on armaments. The already tense situation over armaments between
Germany and the international community became worse. He argued that Germany
deserved security from the alleged threat that Germany believed Britain and France posed
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to it. That security could come only through Germany’s rearmament or the disarmament
of other nations. He hinted at possible war when he quoted an old German song whose
lyrics expressed “‘there is no death more beautiful than to be killed by the enemy…[and]
fathers must fall on the battlefield.’”186 Almost simultaneously, Hitler himself was to
speak before the Reichstag, the German parliament, on the issue of armaments and the
Disarmament Conference. His speech was anticipated eagerly by the foreign press and
other observers. Many expected Hitler to agree with von Papen.187
In his speech on 17 May, which received attention in both The New York Times
and The Times, Hitler surprised everyone. He agreed that the German government would
respect the armament restrictions in the Treaty of Versailles. Additionally, he agreed with
a recent pronouncement from United States President Franklin Roosevelt, a major
proponent of world peace. Hitler claimed that the German delegation at Geneva was
ready to resume talks, beginning with a discussion of MacDonald’s previous proposal. He
continued to push for the disarmament of other nations, but claimed that Germany would
not rearm.188 Hitler’s more reasonable, moderate tone noted by The New York Times and
The Times was attributed to his interest in carrying the support of Britain, particularly
because the British delegation had been sympathetic towards Germany.189
Unknown to the world, Hitler’s lengthy speech marked the first time he deployed
his tactic, which he pursued consistently during his early years in power, of justifying his
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military plans for Germany by citing the injustices of the Versailles Treaty and thereby
setting himself up as the apostle of peace and branding the British and French as the
guilty parties who were unwilling to accept his well-meant proposals. By May 1933, he
had concluded that Germany’s rearmament by “normal means,” i.e. through agreement in
the League of Nations’ Disarmament Conference, was not possible. Nearing the end of
the speech, he revealed his ulterior purpose in giving it: laying the basis for Germany’s
future withdrawal from both the League and the conference. Observers in Britain and the
United States, including journalists, seemed to ignore the German chancellor’s threat: “It
would be difficult for us to remain a member of the League of Nations as a Volk
subjected to constant degradation.”190
After hearing Hitler’s speech, most delegations at the Disarmament Conference
were cautiously optimistic. However, they waited to see how the German delegation
would react at the conference to determine “whether Chancellor Hitler’s speech
represents a genuine change of policy or merely a time-gaining maneuver.”191 The
American press seemed more skeptical. Newsweek, an American news magazine,
reminded the public of “German tactics [that] have become familiar in Geneva”192 in
light of the earlier deadlock and Hitler’s recent speech. The article noted how the
Germans had demanded both security and armaments equality, hinting that nothing
would change once the Disarmament Conference continued.193 The Literary Digest,
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another American news and cultural magazine, was equally dubious toward Hitler’s
speech and regarding the German delegation. The article questioned whether Hitler could
be trusted to fulfill the pledges he made. The magazine stated that many foreign news
services reported a sense of “skepticism” and “distrust” and that Hitler’s speech was a
“smoke-screen,” meant to be “soothing to foreign ears.”194 Perhaps German policy had
changed. The Germans were poised, along with the French and British, to sign a ten-year
peace accord and pact, proposed by the Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini, which held
these powers, in addition to Italy, responsible for maintaining peace in Europe.195
Both the British and American press seemed poorly instructed on the interests of
both Italy and Germany in concluding the so-called Four Power Pact. Mussolini had
pressed for the pact because he, like Hitler, disliked the international security system
based on the League of Nations. The Italian leader feared that the Nazi government had
nationalist designs on eventually uniting with neighboring Austria and with the heavily
German Tyrol region in northern Italy. Mussolini intended to use the rise of Hitler’s
regime to produce a new concert of major powers to lessen the seeming dangers to
Austria and Italy from German nationalism. The Italians hoped to divert German
nationalist claims on other German communities to the German-Polish frontier and other
areas of Eastern Europe. Also, in this way Mussolini could present himself to Britain and
France as a mediator in European and world affairs. As for the Germans, Hitler,
Blomberg, the defense minister, and Göring, agreed to the pact because it committed
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Germany to nothing, but it might provide, in the words of German historian, Wilhelm
Deist, writing after much research on the subject in 1990, “a breathing-space for
rearmament.”196
The Not So Quiet Summer
However, at the beginning of June 1933, when it came time to sign Mussolini’s
Four-Power Pact, the Germans refused. The Hitler regime argued that it would not sign
the pact unless France began to disarm and reduced its armaments. British, French,
Italian, and German officials met to avert another potential crisis.197 Finally on 7 June
1933, the Four-Power Pact was signed in Rome. The pact, at least one American paper
believed, was to usher in peace and “assure disarmament of the four powers in case of
partial or complete failure of the Geneva Arms Conference.”198 However, the pact never
entered into force because Germany withdrew three months later from the League of
Nations.
For most of June, the Disarmament Conference recessed to prepare for the
upcoming World Economic Conference scheduled to begin on 12 June 1933. On 27 June
when the Disarmament Conference resumed meeting, Chairman Arthur Henderson
proposed that the meeting adjourn until 16 October 1933. The conference did so because
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most nations represented there were focused on the Economic Conference that was in
progress and were unable to devote the necessary time for discussions on disarmament.199
The adjournment of the Disarmament Conference did not stop the Germans from
continuing to push issues concerning armaments and military force. On 17 June, Hitler
named Baldur von Schirach, a Nazi Party member and youth leader, to lead German
youth organizations. The New York Times reported that the appointment of Schirach was
“the Nazis’ latest step in securing undisputed dominance over the minds of German
youth.”200 The article implied that German youth organizations were a new creation of
the Nazis. Such organizations, however, were not new. Hitler youth groups had existed
since 1926.201 On the 19 and 20 June, The Manchester Guardian and The Times reported
that the SA and German secret police raided the offices of the “Green Shirts,” the “army”
of the German National Party, and arrested its members. The Nazi regime ordered that
the “Green Shirts” be dissolved and prohibited. Although the Nationalist Party had been a
political ally of the Nazi Party, Hitler and his regime argued that the Nationalists had
become infiltrated with Communists.202 As the newspapers reported correctly, the SA
believed that “the ‘National Socialist revolution’ had not yet achieved its ends,”203
because the threat of Communism to Nazism still remained. As a result, the SA continued
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its violent assault on German Communists, supported in its attack by Hitler and aiming at
eliminating the so-called danger to his regime.
Near the end of June and beginning of July, there was a more immediate menace
to Germany than Communism. The four major Anglo-American newspapers reported
there was a supposed air raid over Germany. The German government claimed that on 25
June two foreign aircraft were identified flying over the capital, Berlin, at a low altitude.
The planes supposedly dropped Communist leaflets and literature that the Nazi regime
viewed as threatening. The government claimed also that foreign aircraft were spotted
over the cities of Kottbus, Weimar, and Mannheim. The alleged air raid prompted Nazi
officials to demand aerial armaments and the establishment of an aerial police force for
the defense of Germany.204
The French government, in response, opposed strongly the German government’s
demands. The French pointed out that the demands were in violation of restrictions in the
Treaty of Versailles.205 Nevertheless, the German government began to shop around for
military aircraft. Reports in London claimed that the Germans had contracted a British
aircraft manufacturer for the construction of at least sixty military planes. The British
government investigated the matter, which revealed that the Germans had contacted the
Hawker Engineering Company, a British firm, and other companies, about purchasing
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aircraft. Immediately, the British government intervened, prohibiting the British
companies from selling the planes to Germany.206
In reality, the “air raid” over Germany, which received substantial press coverage,
was manufactured by the Germans themselves, solely for their own purposes. The “raid”
has been described by at least one recent military historian as “an aerial equivalent of
Hitler’s political Reichstag Fire hoax.”207 The Germans justified their demand for aerial
armaments by claiming that had the Germans been able to defend themselves, then the
“air raid” would not have happened.208 The timing of this event was no coincidence. It
was only in May 1933 that the Germans had fully developed “plans for the
implementation of an immediate program to produce 1,000 aircraft.”209
In the meantime, during July, the major Anglo-American newspapers reported
that while the Disarmament Conference was adjourned, the British chairman Henderson
traveled to France and Germany to speak with leaders of both countries. Henderson
thought that by meeting individually with the leaders in private, instead of negotiating on
a world stage at the Disarmament Conference, that more could be achieved. He met first
with French Premier Daladier to discuss methods of armaments controls and inspections.
Then Henderson traveled to Germany and discussed with Hitler the fears that the French
206
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had about German rearmament. Both Daladier and Hitler were receptive to Henderson.
He suggested that the two men should meet to discuss such matters and attempt to resolve
them.210 However, the impression from the newspaper accounts that Henderson’s
disarmament tour was a success was false. There was no compromise or even the hope of
a “real advance towards a compromise.”211
Moreover, for the remainder of the summer, what dominated the headlines in the
four major British and American papers was the increasing militarization of the SA. Hitler
decreed a reorganization of the SA into regional groups. The Manchester Guardian
reported that Hitler ordered such a reorganization so the SA could be transformed into a
military force by integrating it into the German army. The paper said it was only a matter
of time until this happened.212 The reports were partially correct. About 250,000 SA
troops were to be trained as reserve soldiers for the German army,213 but the SA itself was
not going to be transformed into a military force. Later it was revealed that the SA troops
received the same training as regular army soldiers. In addition to training, the SA troops
were provided the same or similar arms and uniforms as regular German army soldiers.
According to the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, this was prohibited.214
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The Beginning of the End of the Disarmament Conference?
When September 1933 began, European delegations from the Disarmament
Conference started to prepare for the meeting’s eventual reconvening scheduled for 16
October. On 3 September, Hitler attended a Nuremberg rally of Nazi supporters and
troops. Even though this was a massive demonstration of force and support for him, he
continued to pledge that Germany sought only peace and that war was unnecessary.215
Prospects of peace were doubtful. There were new accounts in The Manchester Guardian
about the continued militarization of the SA. The SA was being trained “in the use of light
and heavy machine-guns, mine-throwers, and artillery.”216 The British and French
governments alleged that Germany was rearming secretly. They agreed that strong
diplomacy was the best solution to Germany’s current rearmament. Both Paris and
London had gathered evidence of Germany’s secret rearmament and discussed it in
preparation for a meeting in the French capital with the British, French, and American
delegations to the Disarmament Conference.217 The Germans were alerted to the evidence
gathering expeditions of the British and the French. The Soviet Union, which had not
been invited to participate in the Disarmament Conference, tipped the Germans off after
Moscow was approached to provide information on German armament activities.218
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The major Anglo-American newspapers reported correctly that British, French,
and American officials met in Paris during the middle of September and were able to
agree on several items they would present at the Disarmament Conference. Both Britain
and France had clear evidence of Germany’s rearmament and agreed that it would also
take the backing of the United States and Italy to force Germany’s hand. Officials in Paris
also agreed that some revisions to the Treaty of Versailles could be made, but only after
the Disarmament Conference reconvened and the matter had been discussed further. The
French insisted that Germany would have to permit inspectors to ensure it was abiding by
armament restrictions.219
Britain and France insisted that Germany should only be allowed to start rearming
after a trial period and to a limited extent. A French demand that Britain should take part
in sanctions against Germany should the latter violate the Versailles Treaty or evade arms
controls remained unsuccessful. The British formulated cautiously proposals for Britain’s
action if Germany violated its disarmament obligations, and virtually ruled out any
occupation of German territory. According to historian Deist, “Britain did not wish to be
responsible for any guarantees that might involve her in continental commitments.” The
United States, too, opposed sanctions. Despite their differences on the proper way to treat
Germany, British and French leaders “did not differ fundamentally in their estimate of the
danger from Germany.”220
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As the Disarmament Conference was about to meet at the beginning of October,
the German government became more aggressive in tone and demands. Both The New
York Times and The Manchester Guardian followed the increasingly strident German
attitude. While the Germans were able to agree to rearm gradually for themselves and to
approve a standardization of European armies, they were indifferent to the possibilities of
supervision by the French or another European nation over arms control. Berlin also
wanted fewer restrictions on armaments than what the British, French, and Americans
had agreed on at Paris. The Germans pressed for experimental weapons and additional
tanks and military aircraft.221 The most serious of the German demands was that other
nations must disarm because Germany had fulfilled all her obligations and requirements
in the Versailles Treaty.222
Such demands reported on by The New York Times and The Manchester Guardian
were described long after World War II by the British historian, John Wheeler-Bennett,
as going “further than the previous demands of Germany.” 223 Soon the German
government escalated the crisis when it threatened “to rearm immediately unless the
Geneva arms conference produces a satisfactory new arms accord in place of the
Versailles treaty.”224 The German demands were too great for the British and French,
who had evidence that the Germans were rearming already. Both London and Paris
refused to agree to what the Germans wanted.
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In a sudden and stunning response, the Germans removed their delegation from
the Disarmament Conference, and Hitler withdrew Germany from the League of Nations.
Both withdrawals occurred on 14 October. The Washington Post reported that Germany
claimed it had been “dishonored,” while The Manchester Guardian said that Germany
had been “humiliated” over the way the Disarmament Conference had treated the
country.225 The New Statesman and Nation, a British magazine, believed the
Disarmament Conference was already a failure. It claimed that too much negotiation had
occurred and that the “conference is no longer a Disarmament Conference.”226 The
American magazine, The Living Age, published an article alleging the Disarmament
Conference had been a failure because “Germany has become an army of barracks, a
single vast concentration camp for the coming of war.”227 The writer, Ernst Henri, alleged
that Germany was rearming and leading Europe on a path to war because of the failures
of the conference.228 An article in The Spectator suggested that war was not imminent
because Germany had not fully rearmed. It emphasized that Germany was politically
isolated and opposed strongly by the British and the French.229
The future of the Disarmament Conference and peace of Europe were now in
question with the German delegation’s withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference
and the pessimistic attitude held by many in the Anglo-American world toward the
success of such diplomatic discussions.
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CHAPTER THREE
15 OCTOBER 1933 TO 30 JUNE 1934

Germany’s Self Isolation
When the German delegation withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and
Germany left the League of Nations on 14 October 1933, the resulting diplomatic crisis
received considerable press coverage over the course of the next several weeks. The press
was attempting to explain why the withdrawal had occurred and what the other nations
were to do next.
According to The Washington Post, the tensions between Germany and Europe
were nothing new and had begun with the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. The newspaper’s
timeline pointed out concerns over armaments began to be voiced in December 1930
when German General Wilhelm Groener announced that he believed “Germany stands
alone unarmed in a Europe armed to the teeth.”230 At the time Groener, Germany’s
defense minister since January 1928, had reacted with anger to a recent decision by a
League of Nations preparatory disarmament commission in Geneva, to which Germany
had sent representatives, that all existing treaty provisions on arms limitations (i.e. the
Treaty of Versailles among others) would remain in force.231 Once Hitler became
chancellor of Germany in 1933, he took General Groener’s statements further and began
to demand armament equality among all nations. When Germany was not allowed to
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rearm or when the other European nations did not disarm to the levels of Germany, the
German delegation was withdrawn from the League of Nations and the Disarmament
Conference.232
A report in The Times revealed “the break-up of the Disarmament Conference was
predicted at different times…but no one could have foreseen the headstrong abruptness of
the action.”233 Unlike The Washington Post, The New York Times and The Times
(London) placed blame solely on Hitler for the crisis because of the demands he had
made.234
Historian Sally Marks described the reaction to Germany’s withdrawal from the
Disarmament Conference similar to the reports in the newspapers. She wrote that when
“Hitler withdrew Germany…[it was] dismaying but not astounding.”235 She explained
that Hitler continued to make overtures of peace because of “the West’s fear of war and
love of peace…[and because peace was] the language of Geneva.”236
Many Europeans began to fear the possibility of war. The New York Times
featured a story on Europeans who lived through the Great War. The story presented
parallels between the causes of war in 1914 and the current diplomatic crisis. Such
similarities included aggressive nationalism as the driving force behind Germany and
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Germany’s claims that it was surrounded by enemies which sought to destroy it.237 Much
later, historian John Wheeler-Bennett explained that this new period would be filled with
“fear and horror…[and] tremendous happenings.”238 The press reported accurately the
thoughts that many Europeans now had.
European political leaders moved quickly to attempt to resolve the diplomatic
crisis and to quash fears of war among their citizens. The Manchester Guardian reported
that the British delegation proposed there be a temporary adjournment of the
Disarmament Conference for a period of ten days to allow tensions to ease and give the
remaining participants a chance to reorganize and plan.239 Along with The Manchester
Guardian, The New York Times and The Times (London) reported that the delegation
reiterated that peace was possible, but would require a spirit of cooperation, mutual trust,
and disarmament among all nations. The threat of war was downplayed.240 Illustrative of
this point, British Attorney General Thomas Inskip said in an article in The New York
Times that “‘war is a good way off yet’.”241
The Anglo-American newspapers seemed to imply that there was a clear direction
for the Disarmament Conference and peace after the withdrawal of Germany from the
Conference. This was perhaps to prevent panic and fear among European citizens.
However, historian Edward Bennett has interpreted the events quite differently. Bennett
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claimed that “the delegates in Geneva showed confusion,…began to confer, and they
continued to do so.”242 The remaining participants at the Conference proposed numerous
ideas which included continuing armaments discussions without Germany, convincing
Germany to return to the Disarmament Conference by allowing the country to rearm, and
adjourning the conference for a period of ten days.243 The newspapers were correct that
the Disarmament Conference had been adjourned.
According to The Manchester Guardian and The New York Times, Hitler and the
German government had plans other than peace. Hitler requested that German President
Hindenburg call for new parliamentary elections and a plebiscite to be held on 12
November 1933, which would serve as a vote of confidence for Hitler and the National
Socialist government. Both newspapers believed Hitler would use the affirmative vote to
demonstrate to the other European powers that he was merely fulfilling the wishes of the
electorate by withdrawing Germany from the League of Nations and the Disarmament
Conference.244 Historian Richard Evans explained that Hitler was utilizing the plebiscite
for the same reasons The Manchester Guardian and The New York Times had reported. It
was a demonstration of the desires of the German people—desires that Hitler was
fulfilling.245
Hitler and the National Socialist government solidified further their intentions
when German Foreign Minister Constantin Freiherr von Neurath announced publicly that
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Germany would not disarm. He declared the issue was a matter of equality, such that
Germany deserved armaments as much as any other nation did.246
The Germans wasted little time in their quest for armament equality for their
defense against alleged European enemies. Vague reports appeared in the British press
that the Germans were planning defenses against aerial attacks. The German government
encouraged industries through tax breaks to construct air defenses such as bunkers,
alarms, and anti-aircraft munitions.247 However, in a speech at the end of October 1933,
reported by The Washington Post, Göring denied that Germany had military aircraft. He
stated that Germany had destroyed its military aircraft according to the terms of the
Versailles Treaty and orders from the Disarmament Conference.248
Historian James Corum has shown that aerial rearmament was far more advanced
than what the newspapers and Göring had stated. According to Corum, this time period
was “fruitful” for aerial rearmament and strategy.249 The Germans had been training at
bases in the Soviet Union for “reconnaissance, fighter, and bombing” campaigns.250 It
was also during October 1933 that “the first combat air units of the Luftwaffe came into
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being…when a seaplane squadron for naval operations, a bomber wing, and a dive
bomber squadron were officially established.”251
On 26 October 1933 when the Disarmament Conference reconvened, the
chairman, Arthur Henderson, announced that the conference would adjourn again until
early December 1933. The adjournment was to give the remaining participants additional
time to plan negotiations with Germany in the hope that the latter would voluntarily
return to the conference.252 According to historian Edward Bennett, the pattern of
postponing the Disarmament Conference would continue through the remainder of 1933
and into 1934. He noted that the conference would ultimately remain adjourned until 29
May 1934.253
Developments in Germany: the SA, Aerial Armaments, and a Vote of Confidence
As the conference adjourned, other military developments took shape in
Germany. The Manchester Guardian published an article on the SA troops, in which the
newspaper described persecution of some SA men by the Nazi government for being
alleged traitors and threats to the Nazi regime. The Nazi government learned of the
supposed liberal or Communist sympathizers in the SA ranks from spies and from other
SA troops who had reported their comrades. The accused troops were then placed in
concentration camps for “making jokes,…harmless ancedoetes,…[and] harmless
witticisms.”254
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The American historian Gordon Craig has written that Germany’s withdrawal
from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations was the “beginning of a
new and promising era for the [German] army”255 because many soldiers believed “the
action at Geneva seemed to give substance to promises which Hitler had been making to
them since January [1933].”256 Germany was no longer bound by the conference and the
League, which had attempted to restrict Germany’s militarization. Historian Matthew
Cooper explained that “Hitler unhesitatingly supported the Reichswehr in its claim to be
the rightful, and sole bearer of arms in the defense of the Reich…[because of] his belief
in maintaining the Army’s traditional role.”257 With the withdrawal of Germany from the
conference and the League and the SA persecutions, the Nazi government demonstrated
its support of the army as the “sole bearer of arms”—not the possibly untrustworthy,
traitorous SA which supposedly supported liberals and Communists. Persecution served
as a way of demoralizing the SA and instilling fear into SA troops.
In early November 1933, the issue of aerial defense was raised again by Berlin.
The Manchester Guardian and The New York Times reported the Nazi government was
attempting to implement courses on aerial defense in the public education curriculum.
The Nazis claimed to have thousands of instructors ready to teach the defense courses258
“to promote an interest in aerial defense and attack and in war generally, as well as
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practical preparedness.”259 These allegations made by the newspapers were actually
several months old. Historian James Corum wrote that “civilian” flight and aviation
schools were established in early spring 1933 for training pilots and other officers for the
future air force.260
On 12 November 1933, the plebiscite was held that Hitler had called for at the end
of October. The German government and the Anglo-American press expected a large
voter turnout. The New York Times and The Manchester Guardian noted that the German
government predicted an affirmative vote from the German people on its decision to
withdraw from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference. Of the over 43
million votes cast, 93% of the electorate favored the decision to withdraw.261 Much later,
historian Richard Evans added that the plebiscite “delivered the predictably
overwhelming majority in favor of Hitler’s decision, thanks not least to massive
intimidation and electoral manipulation.”262
The results of the plebiscite concerned other European nations. The French were
reluctant to do anything. The Manchester Guardian showed that Paris thought there was
nothing that could be done diplomatically. Additionally, France preferred to wait and see
how Britain would react to Germany’s defiance and the recent plebiscite.263
The Anglo-American press reported that the British were taking the initiative to
revive the Disarmament Conference. British Secretary of State John Simon and his
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under-Secretary Anthony Eden traveled to Geneva to resume discussions. There was a
looming sense of pessimism. The Times reported that many politicians in the British and
French camps believed that discussions would be difficult to continue because there had
been little progress made on which to build.264 The Italians hesitated about resuming
discussions and the Disarmament Conference.265 The British, however, were determined
to bring Germany back into the conference, even if that meant “meet[ing] them at Rome
or elsewhere.”266
As soon as the British attempted to resume the Disarmament Conference, the
latter adjourned again. Citing difficulty working with the Italians and the absence of the
Germans, the British delegation at the Disarmament Conference recessed the conference
until 15 January 1934.267 The Manchester Guardian printed reports that informal talks
would continue among the British, French, Americans, and possibly the Russians. These
countries hoped to continue the dialogue on disarmament as well as address problems
with the Disarmament Conference in an effort to resolve those before resuming in
January.268
The lack of confidence in diplomacy and the Disarmament Conference came as
no surprise. Gerhard Weinberg has explained that most of Western Europe “had no
confidence that the Germans would…observe any disarmament agreement.”269 He added
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that “since no one had taken any action against Germany at this point it was unlikely that
anyone would do so.”270 This meant that any diplomacy would likely fail, as would the
Disarmament Conference. As previously discussed, historian Edward Bennett noted that
the Disarmament Conference would continue to experience difficulties and would remain
adjourned until 29 May 1934. All this pointed to the failure of diplomacy and efforts at
disarmament.
The End of 1933 and the Beginning of 1934
In December 1933, Shepard Stone, a scholar on Germany, wrote in Current
History that it was obvious that Germany had been rearming despite restrictions in the
Treaty of Versailles. He noted that the German military budget, which was about
678,000,000 marks, was high considering the size to which the military was supposed to
be restricted. He also noted that the German military budget was larger than the British
military budget.271 In historian Martin Kitchen’s A Military History of Germany, which
appeared years later, he confirmed such increases in military expenditures and budgeting
that the Anglo-American press had reported in late 1933. By Kitchen’s calculations,
Germany’s military budget had increased over 2,000 percent from Hitler’s ascension to
power in 1933 to the beginning of the Second World War in 1939.272 He also noted that
“from 1933 to 1936 industrial profits rose by 433 percent.”273 The manufacture of
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armaments contributed to over half of Germany’s industry.274 The statistics indicated that
Germany was rearming substantially.
The initial response of Britain and France to this revelation was to press for the
expansion of their own military forces. A report in The Washington Post revealed that the
French were trying to build additional battle cruisers for their navy and “convert
commercial planes into bombers.”275 According to The Literary Digest, the British
government urged an expansion of its military forces, particularly the air force. London
believed that Germany was building a massive air force, and that Britain was most
vulnerable from an aerial attack. London proposed that the air force must be strengthened
immediately to combat the perceived German menace.276
Britain and France would have to expand their militaries against the threat of war
because, since the Great War, the two countries “had disarmed to a very considerable
extent.”277 Weinberg wrote that Britain and France, as well as other countries, had
“participated in a number of international naval disarmament arrangements…[and] had
drastically reduced their land forces as well.”278 The British and French armies had been
reduced to levels prior to that of the Great War. France, in particular, had shortened “the
term of service [for troops]…[and] neglected…its equipment.”279
The French attempted diplomatic talks with Berlin, but those failed. Germany
continued to demand armaments equality and the right to rearm legally. The German
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government also wanted the return to Germany of the Saar region, an industrial rich area
east of the Rhine River placed in 1919 by the Versailles Treaty under League of Nations
and French control for fifteen years.280 The British intervened and attempted diplomatic
negotiations with Germany.281 Similar to reports in the newspapers, Wheeler-Bennett
described the end of 1933 as being filled with more questions than answers for the future.
Germany had demanded the Saar region without the plebiscite the French had desired.
Optimism was slim as Germany’s “demands constituted a great degree of rearmament
and that any real hope of disarmament…was out of the question.”282 1933 ended with
stalled diplomacy and an unclear future as to whether peace would be possible.
The year 1934 began with The Washington Post covering a German New Year’s
celebration attended by Chancellor Hitler and President von Hindenburg. At the
festivities, Hindenburg praised Hitler’s leadership and described it as “a turning point in
German history.”283 Hindenburg believed that Germany was positioned for political and
economic greatness under Hitler’s leadership. Hitler also spoke at the celebration. His
speech was a simple reiteration that Germany wanted nothing but peace.284
To begin the new year, there were several reports about Germany’s military
strength and preparations. The New York Times asserted that Germany was developing
advanced military aircraft and was capable of producing significantly more planes than in
the Great War. According to the article, Germany had about twenty aircraft munitions
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factories in operation, such as Heinkel, which were manufacturing heavily-armed and fast
bombers.285 What The New York Times failed to mention was that Heinkel had been
developing air munitions since the 1920s and into the early 1930s, not just beginning in
1933 or early 1934. Heinkel, along with other aircraft munitions factories, were
implementing the German government’s plan for “an air force of over 1,000 aircraft
[which developed] during 1931-1932.”286 For example, in 1932, Heinkel manufactured
the He 51, which according to military historian James Corum, “carried two machine
guns, and had a maximum speed of 205 miles per hour.”287 By early 1933, Heinkel was
ready to mass produce the He 59, a bomber plane capable of carrying a bomb load of
over a ton. Heinkel had also produced the He 45 and 46 that served as reconnaissance
aircraft.288
Almost simultaneously, The Washington Post claimed that German naval tonnage
had increased significantly since the end of the Great War. The Post stated that naval
tonnage was about 320,000 tons at the end of the Great War and had increased to over
four million by 1931. The paper observed that naval tonnage continued to increase
despite restrictions in the Treaty of Versailles.289 The analysis in 1973 of historian CarlAxel Gemzell reflected the findings of The Washington Post. He wrote that “the
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[German] navy was drastically reduced after the defeat in World War I. Only a handful of
ships were left,…but gradually a new fleet was built up again.”290
Moreover, several Anglo-American newspapers reported that the French, with the
start of the new year, tried negotiations with Germany. France had proposed a 10-year
non-aggression pact with Germany. In exchange for the pact, Germany would be allowed
to assemble an army of 300,000 troops. At the time, the German rearmament program
called for that number of troops. The French had the support of the British, but the press
expected that the French would reject Germany’s plans for rearmament.291 However,
there was more to the news stories than what the Anglo-American papers had printed.
Wheeler-Bennett observed later that despite France’s proposal, the French faced “a
prospect of a very terrifying nature.”292 If the negotiations were accepted by both parties,
Germany would be legally allowed a larger army, while the French would have the nonaggression pact, which French officials “regarded as less binding than Germany’s [other]
obligations.”293 Even Britain’s support for France was questionable because of “the Prime
Minister’s [Ramsay MacDonald, Labour Party leader and head of a coalition or “National
Government” with Conservatives] emotional sympathy for Germany.”294
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The New York Times and The Times (London) reported that the negotiations
finally came to an impasse when the Germans refused to compromise.295 According to
Wheeler-Bennett, France had agreed to allow Germany to increase its army to 300,000
troops “on the condition that the para-military organizations were disbanded.”296
However, Germany believed it had a right “to maintain the SA and SS as well as the
300,000 men of the reorganized Reichswehr.”297 In an effort to save the negotiations,
according to Foreign Affairs, the French were willing to consider reducing their
armaments and military forces. Considering Germany’s secret rearmament and
aggressiveness, the French were hesitant to reduce their own armaments because of the
threat Germany posed.298 France and Germany finally came to “a complete
deadlock…[and the realization] the French and German points of view were as widely
separated as ever.”299
Despite the stalemated armaments negotiations with the French, Hitler and
German military leaders feared France’s superior military power and sought to treat the
French with special care. In Hitler’s long-term foreign policy goal of one day expanding
German living space (Lebensraum) to the East, principally by going to war against, and
seizing the vast lands of, the Soviet Union, France represented a major potential factor
inhibiting such plans. During 1934 and after, Hitler offered numerous statements, both in
public and private, seeking to reassure the Paris government of Germany’s desire for
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peace. Also he avoided challenging France in ways that might have raised its suspicions
even more toward the Germans; consequently, he forbade the development of a Nazi
movement in neighboring Alsace. Simultaneously, he pursued a policy of isolating
France, especially by cultivating relations with Britain, Italy, and Poland.300
It was hardly surprising, therefore, that on 27 January, The Manchester Guardian
broke the news that diplomats from Germany and Poland had signed a ten-year nonaggression pact, which was described as “reinforc[ing] Herr Hitler’s repeated promises of
the Nazis’ peaceful intentions towards Poland.”301 However, the article revealed either
party could renounce the pact with six months notice.302 As for the Nazi government, it
concluded the agreement with Poland primarily to attempt to loosen the latter from its
alliance with France, first concluded in 1921. British historian R. A. Parker believed “it
was impossible to be certain what…the Polish government thought they were doing.”303
Parker claimed that one camp in the Polish government thought Hitler could actually be
trusted and posed no legitimate threat to Poland. The other camp in the Polish
government believed the pact would secure Poland while Western Europe remained in a
diplomatic deadlock with Germany.304
Britain’s Plan
On 1 February, the Anglo-American press reported that the British had published
their armaments restrictions plan in an official government White Paper. The British
wanted the cooperation and participation in the plan of Germany, France, Poland, and
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Italy. According to the press, the British plan called for the restriction of certain
armaments and the gradual disarmament of heavily armed nations or the promise that
these nations would not increase the number of their armaments. Proposals in the White
Paper included banning anti-aircraft guns, reducing tank units, and limiting each nation’s
military forces to 200,000 troops.305
What the press termed a White Paper was in fact a British government
memorandum of 25 January 1934, supported by Mussolini, which London communicated
to the other states, including Germany, on the 29th. According to the memo, Germany
was to be allowed an army of 200,000 to 300,000 troops and also light tanks. The British
even agreed to the creation of a German military air force if the disarmament
commission, established by the Versailles Treaty, failed to reach a decision for the
abolition of such forces within two years. In the numbers of German troops, the British
did not count the Nazi paramilitary groups, the SA and SS. However, the memo
stipulated, apparently with French security in mind, that Germany should not attain
equality of rights in armaments for another ten years.306
Apparently unknown to the press, the British plan was, in fact, a counter-proposal
to suggestions that Hitler had made previously to the British ambassador in Berlin, Sir
Eric Phipps. In a meeting with Phipps on 24 October 1933, ten days after Germany had
left the League of Nations and Disarmament Conference, Hitler “offered” to the British a
German army of 300,000—which the Germans, in reality, had included in their planned
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rearmament program—equipped with defensive weapons only. Further, the Nazi leader
had urged the British to rearm at sea and in the air. With bilateral negotiations with
French going nowhere, Hitler turned increasingly toward attempting to isolate France by
turning more firmly toward Britain and seeking to establish a triangular relationship
between London, Berlin, and Rome.
At the beginning of 1934, Hitler viewed Britain, not France, as the primary
obstacle to German hegemony in Europe. The British, he believed, would not remain
forever allied with France. The latter’s enhanced power in Europe, supposedly created by
the Paris peace settlement in 1919, had strengthened France in world competition for
trade and empire, thus placing France against the key interests of London. With his
proposals to Phipps, Hitler hoped to divide Britain from its post-Great War alliance with
the French.
In February 1934, the German government tried to persuade the British to agree to
the early creation of a German air force, by pointing out to British officials France’s air
strength and arguing for a greater balance of power in the air in western Europe. Soon
afterwards, in April, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Hitler’s Nazi party sycophant and wine
merchant friend, was appointed German commissioner for disarmament. Hitler’s main
objective in the talks was to evade the British proposal of January, which would have
delayed German air armament by at least two years. Also the Germans offered to disarm
the SA and SS and place them under supervision, a proposal that impressed some British
officials. However, according to Wilhelm Deist, it appeared evident to London “that the
German offer—supplemented by an undertaking, if German’s army was fixed at 300,000
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men, to reduce the police force by 50,000—was to attempt to prise Britain away from
France, to undermine the European security system, and to bring about a German-BritishItalian combination.”307
In Weinberg’s words, Hitler’s attitude toward Britain “was a mixture of
admiration and hate.” On the one hand, the Nazi leader “recognized in the British upper
classes the product of a process of selective breeding not entirely unlike what he hoped to
accomplish in Germany.” On the other hand, “Jews were allowed to play a part in British
society [and] Britain had a democratic form of government.” The Nazis imagined that the
Jews had “all sorts of great influence” in Britain and, by definition, “democracy
destroyed responsibility and leadership in a society.”308 Hitler hoped for a German
partnership with London, in which the latter, in return for Germany’s toleration of
Britain’s overseas empire, would permit Germany a future free hand in Europe and a
rearmament that favored its land-based expansionist aims in the East, especially in
Russia. Consequently, he would temporarily downplay German world trade and global
ambitions. He believed, moreover, that both Germany and Britain had a mutual interest in
combating the Soviet Union, i.e. the “worldwide Jewish-Bolshevik enemy.”
The so-called British White Paper of January 1934 did little to encourage Hitler in
such wishes, and the British plan received its share of criticism from other sources.
British and American newspapers emphasized that the Italian government wanted to push
the issue of rearmament and armament equality, not the disarmament of Germany,
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because, according to Wheeler-Bennett, the Italians believed that any “degree of
disarmament was for the moment impossible.”309
Unlike the Italians, and despite Hitler’s continued, profuse statements professing
publicly his desire for peace, the French believed that Germany posed a serious threat.
France argued that it had already disarmed sufficiently and should not have to continue
doing so under the terms of the British White Paper. France wanted to maintain its
current levels of armaments and even increase them to guarantee its security.310
Historians note that Britain’s plan was not well received in France because the French
government was displeased that the terms of the White Paper favored Germany. The
French thought that the White Paper catered to Germany and its remilitarization instead
of guaranteeing the security of Europe. France was adamant that Germany should not be
allowed to rearm, while other countries had to reduce their armaments leaving them
vulnerable.311
Berlin was not satisfied with the White Paper because the German government
still wanted full rearmament. While the British plan went a long way to meet the German
desire, it did not do so in the air.312 Wheeler-Bennett believed that “it [the White Paper]
was…impossible for Germany to accept.”313 At the time, in February 1934, an
explanation for Germany’s dissatisfaction was found in an analysis piece in The Literary
Digest. Supposedly, the German government claimed that France and other European
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nations were a threat to it. These nations sought to destroy Germany with the huge
military forces they possessed. The article concluded that Germany would only be
content if “the equality…by a certain adaptation of its armaments to the level of other
nations”314 was allowed. Germany rejected the proposal, but there was not much else the
European powers could do.315
On 14 February, The New York Times reported the Disarmament Conference was
delayed again. The conference, which had been scheduled to resume at an unspecified
time in February, was now postponed to 10 April 1934. The New York Times reported
that conference chairman Arthur Henderson hoped that the nations could continue
diplomatic talks without the meeting’s formality and come to a mutual agreement
regarding armaments. However, some expert observers at the time believed that the
criticisms and disagreements over the White Paper produced the delaying of the
conference.316
Along with the announcement of the conference’s delay, as news that the conference

was postponed went to publication, the Anglo-American press ran several stories of new
military developments inside Germany. The Manchester Guardian and The New York
Times reported that the Nazi government had ordered all university students to serve in
the SA for purposes of national defense. According to military historian Robert O’Neill,
the service in the SA was to provide “pre-military training of youths aged from 18 to 21,
it was to train those from 21 to 26 who were not serving in the Reichswehr,…and it was
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to maintain the military skills of those who were discharged from the Reichswehr.”317
National Socialism was nothing new to Germany’s university campuses. In the 1920s, it
began its infiltration of such schools. The press articles explained that students were
receptive of Nazism primarily because there were not many other extracurricular
opportunities for them in which to participate.318
By the end of February, British and American papers observed that the British
government was trying to find a way to resume negotiations with Germany. Anthony
Eden, British politician and member of Parliament, met in Berlin with Hitler and German
Foreign Minister Neurath. The purpose of the meeting, which the press described as a
“useful discussion,” was to convince Germany to return to the Disarmament Conference.
Instead of a list of demands for the Germans to fulfill, Eden listened to their concerns and
wishes. He hoped the Germans would be more receptive to returning to the conference
under newer, friendlier terms and discussions.319
Long after the fact, Weinberg had a different interpretation of Eden’s meeting
with Hitler and Neurath. Instead of the meeting being “useful discussion,” as described in
the newspapers, Weinberg believed there was still a “deadlock” because British
diplomacy failed to act forcefully with the Germans. Nothing had been accomplished.320
The Road to the Return of the Disarmament Conference
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Spring 1934 brought continuing debates about armaments and the purpose of the
Disarmament Conference, scheduled to resume in April. The New York Times reported
that Dr. Joseph Goebbels, Germany’s minister of propaganda, stated in a public speech
that Germany would not return to the League of Nations or the Disarmament Conference.
He believed Germany had not been given the equality in armaments that it felt it
deserved. In light of Goebbels’ revelation, according to the press reports, France explored
the possibility of reviving its Great War alliance with the British. The French were not
pleased with Germany’s continued refusal to return to the Disarmament Conference and
League of Nations.321 Much later, historian John Wheeler-Bennett confirmed the press
reports, noting that France’s relationship with Britain became increasingly strained as the
Paris government believed French security was being eroded by haphazard British
diplomacy with Germany. With France exploring the possibility of strengthening its
alliance with Britain, the British were faced with “the problem of whether or not they
were prepared to increase the political and military obligations…beyond those already
incurred.”322 The Disarmament Conference could not resume soon enough.
Press articles also highlighted what they viewed were Germany’s increasing
militarism. The Manchester Guardian featured a report that SA troops were being trained
at a rapid pace to become a ready supply of Reichswehr troops. A five-week course
provided training with rifles, machine-guns, anti-aircraft guns, and troops participated in
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large-scale field operations on a weekly basis.323 Several reports in The New York Times
revealed that German military strength had risen to between 2 million and 2.5 million
troops, with sufficient armaments to supply those troops.324
Historian Deist confirmed the general accuracy of the press reports; he noted that
there was a German training program implemented in the spring of 1934 for equipping
new Reichswehr soldiers. However, Deist’s research revealed a major factual error in The
New York Times. According to Deist, it was only later in the spring that Hitler “called for
the final setting up of the planned 300,000 strong army.”325 By 1935, the Germany army
numbered only 280,000 soldiers.326 The New York Times could not accurately claim there
were millions of soldiers when plans for the 300,000 member force exist only in the
planning stage. Nor could there be millions of soldiers when the number was just under
300,000 in early 1935. Perhaps The New York Times included reserves and men who had
received military training. Whether or not the paper intended it, the exaggerated number
would also heighten fear of the Germans and make the threat of war more immediate.
What was not discussed in the Anglo-American press was that on 4 April 1934,
the Nazi government formed the Central Bureau for German Rearmament, to coordinate
the German rearmament effort.327 One can speculate that the press was perhaps more
focused on covering the Disarmament Conference that was scheduled to resume in a few
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days. The other possibility was that the press simply did not know and therefore could not
report it.
By 10 April when the Disarmament Conference formally resumed, The New York
Times believed that there was a new spirit of optimism among the European officials
attending. British and French representatives met “to decide whether to take
responsibility for giving the great powers more time to continue the negotiations…or to
convoke the conference’s general commission.”328 The Manchester Guardian and The
Washington Post expected that Britain and France would “convoke the conference’s
general commission.” This meant that all participants of the Disarmament Conference,
including Germany, would meet to continue the conference. The British and French
leadership set 29 May for the first meeting of all participants.329
The Manchester Guardian and The Washington Post reported that British Foreign
Secretary John Simon, with the concurrence of the House of Commons, began an inquiry
into the German military. According to the press articles, German military expenditures
had increased by about 350,000,000 marks since 1933. Simon expected an explanation
from Germany within a week.330
The German government replied quickly. It justified the expenditures and claimed
that “added equipment will be needed for Germany’s new, larger short-term army…,
obsolete ships must be replaced…, [and the] re-equipment [of] her civil aviation
328
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forces.”331 Germany alleged it was doing nothing wrong. The Nazi government pointed
out that there were no restrictions in the Treaty of Versailles on military expenditures and
that such expenditures were for defense purposes only.332 An essay in the magazine The
New Republic, however, argued that such budgeting was illegal because the
“disbursements…contravene the provisions of the Versailles covenant.”333 The essay
concluded that it was unknown what, if anything, the European powers would or could do
to prevent future German rearmament.334
John Wheeler-Bennett’s later findings confirmed what the Anglo-American press
reported on Germany’s military expenditures. He wrote that “Berlin point[ed] out that the
Treaty of Versailles placed no restriction on military expenditures, and explain[ed] the
increase in the Army estimates as being due to the reorganization of the Reichswehr on a
short-term basis.”335 The only discrepancy in the newspaper articles was the amount of
the expenditures. The latter had increased by some 230,000,000 Reichsmarks.336
At the end of April 1934, reports surfaced that German men at least twenty years
of age were being drafted for military service. The New York Times revealed that
members of the SA and other Nazi organizations had received secret orders to report to
military training camps. Germany, however, denied the charges.337 However, National
Socialism had long gained a considerable following among German youth. This meant
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that many young adults already believed in Nazi ideology and were likely willing to serve
it in military units. An article in The Nation explained that German youth were “hopeless
and helpless in the face of unemployment, yielding to vice or dissipation, or starving in
the streets.”338 Military service was now an option for direction and a future for German
youth who were uncertain of both.
The findings of the Anglo-American press about military conscription in
Germany were partially accurate. According to historians, Hitler and his advisers had
begun working on a new conscription law to be enacted later in the year. Almost
simultaneously, the Nazis created the Reich (national) Labor Force, providing required
military training for all eighteen-year old men. However, military service was not
required at the time. Furthermore, the Nazis gradually added reserve forces to the
German military.339 Military service was not mandatory yet, but the steps to make the
service obligatory were in the making.
Continued Diplomatic Tension and the Night of the Long Knives
On 29 May, the Disarmament Conference resumed, but it was immediately on
shaky ground, according to The New York Times and The Times (London). WheelerBennett described the meeting as having “an atmosphere of gloom and fatalistic
pessimism.”340 The principal sources of discouragement was Germany’s absence from
the gathering. The newspapers reported on uncertainty that existed about what direction
the conference would take. Delegates had to decide whether or not to keep the conference
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alive as it was or simply form a special council to debate armaments issues in the League
of Nations. The delegates decided to continue.341
The Manchester Guardian and The New York Times explained that there were
three directions the conference could take. The first was to reduce British and French
armaments to the number of armaments Germany was supposed to have. The second was
for Britain and France to form an alliance to guarantee their own security. A third option
was to allow rearmament for Germany, thus opening the way for a European armaments
race.342
The French delegation was not pleased with any of the options. French Foreign
Minister Louis Barthou wanted to negotiate a bilateral arms treaty with the Germans. He
argued that France should not “compromise on the German rearmament issue or her
security demands.”343 Wheeler-Bennett reiterated the articles in the press, noting, “the
French Government…would not consent to any system involving an immediate measure
of German rearmament…[and] they would not accept [any of the three options].344
Barthou rhetorically posed the question to the Germans and the international community
as to what threat France and Britain posed to Germany that necessitated more German
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armaments. As the British listened to the French plea, British Foreign Minister John
Simon began to question whether the Disarmament Conference should even continue.345
The resumption of the Disarmament Conference, and extensive coverage of it by
the British and American press, likely helped to obscure for the press a rapidly escalating
power struggle inside Nazi Germany. Only on 16 May 1934 did an article in The New
York Times, buried deeply in the paper, note such a conflict and that it concerned “the
persistent effort of the Nazis to get complete control of the army and the equally
persistent…effort of the army to retain its independence.”346 However, the struggle, cited
in the Times’s article, had been brewing inside Germany for months, but apparently
without reaching the attention of the foreign media.
Since July 1933, the SA, the nearly million member Nazi party paramilitary
organization, had provided at Hitler’s order, as part of his clandestine expansion of the
German military, some 250,000 troops as reservists for the army. At the time, the army
viewed the SA as the principal instrument in the initial stages of German rearmament and
militarization. Consequently, the Reichswehr had sent special teams of instructors to SA
camps to train he reservists.347Also the SA had served the Nazi regime as a major police
auxiliary, consolidating Hitler’s dictatorship by terrorizing its opponents—especially
Communists, socialists, and Jews—and brutalizing them in concentration camps.
Repeatedly, the SA had joined other party radicals in spontaneous violent attacks on
German Jews, even after Hitler had declared in July 1933 an end to the “Nazi revolution”
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at home and, because of concern for rising foreign criticism of his regime, that wild,
unplanned assaults on Jews cease.
However, the SA and its commander, Röhm, felt differently. They demanded
further attacks on alleged Nazi enemies, like the Jews, and insisted on better economic
and political treatment for the SA from the government. But equally or more significant,
Röhm demanded a purge of the German army’s officer corps and the formation by the SA
of a revolutionary or national militia to replace the regular army.348 For these reasons, the
SA presented an increasingly dangerous threat to Hitler as well as the army. Until May
1934, this brewing crisis had eluded the notice of the foreign, including Anglo-American
press.
Instead, into June 1934, Anglo-American newspapers printed stories on the
continued deadlock at the Disarmament Conference. The usually optimistic chairman,
Arthur Henderson, was at a loss as to what direction the conference should take. The
newspapers reported that Henderson believed there were some options still available. The
first called for the disarmament of smaller European states such as Denmark, the
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, so the Disarmament Conference would not
be seen as a complete failure. The French pushed for a second option, that of a possible
aerial armaments parley that would discuss Germany’s aerial rearmament. However, with
an impending meeting on naval matters and the obvious failures of the Disarmament
Conference, such an option on aerial issues was believed to be unlikely. A third option,
which was unanimously agreed on, was Henderson’s call for European nations to
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reconcile their differences with Germany in the hope that the latter would return to the
Disarmament Conference.349
The Manchester Guardian, The New York Times, and The Times (London)
reported that the German delegation declared it would return to the conference only if
Germany was allowed to have armaments equality with other European powers. As a
result, the Disarmament Conference was adjourned indefinitely.350 Later WheelerBennett echoed the newspaper reports, observing that “the meeting adjourned, the
deadlock remained unbroken, [and] the gloom deepened.”351
But by the end of June, the crisis inside Germany involving the power struggle
between the SA and the German army and Hitler had nearly reached the breaking point.
On 1 July 1934, an article in The Washington Post explained that “the radicals—brownshirted Storm Troopers, laborers and many Nazis officials wanted to tighten Nazi control
over every phase of German life.”352 Later research by historians would show that Röhm,
in a meeting with Hitler, had denied “any accusation that he was planning a putsch.”353
However, in a letter between Röhm and one of his subordinate SA commanders, the army
was described as “the main enemy of the SA.”354 At the end of June, German vice
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chancellor Franz von Papen had given a speech critical of Hitler and other Nazis in the
government.355
Several British newspapers reported that Nazi government officials were speaking
increasingly against “reactionaries” and “radicals” in the Nazi party—which, in fact,
meant primarily the SA—and German military. The consequences of being a “radical”
were obvious. The Nazi propaganda minister, Goebbels, warned in a speech that “we will
show them what we are going to do with them” and that they will “have disappeared
within 24 hours.”356 Hitler’s party deputy, Rudolf Hess, called on “genuine and
responsible Nazis…[to] prevent revolution.”357
As subsequent research by historians has revealed, by then, Hitler had long
realized the growing dissatisfaction of the army command over his failure to discipline
Röhm and the other SA “radicals.” Hitler dared not ignore such feelings, especially
because he wished to take over the office and duties of the aged and ill German president,
von Hindenburg, and its military powers, once the president died.
Hitler now acted quickly. On 30 June 1934, in the so-called “Night of the Long
Knives,” at Hitler’s order and personal direction, the other Nazi paramilitary
organization, the SS, using trucks, weapons, and barracks provided it by the army,
murdered without trial Röhm and dozens of his SA lieutenants and other diverse
opponents of the National Socialists. In the aftermath of the bloody purge, both the army
and German president von Hindenburg heaped fulsome praise on Hitler for protecting the
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army’s independence. As countless historians have shown since, the German military
elite had cast its lot with National Socialism. As for the SS, Hitler rewarded its loyalty to
him in carrying out the purge by making the organization autonomous of the SA, placing
it directly under his personal command and allowing it to expand by adding a division of
heavily armed forces and taking over the state political police (Gestapo).
A week after the purge, the American magazine, Newsweek, described what it
believed had happened in a lengthy article that used phrases such as “heads rolling” and
“bleeding bodies.”358 Early on the morning of 30 June, Hitler and Goebbels had traveled
to the office of the Minister of Interior and ordered that “allegedly traitorous Storm Troop
officers” be shot. According to the account, two officers were shot on the spot.359
The Newsweek account continued. Later in the morning, several of Hitler’s loyal
officers and troops arrived at Röhm’s home. Röhm was arrested, and by evening,
executed. During the day, Göring organized the “general clean-up of Storm Troop leaders
and supposed accomplices” throughout Germany.360 General Kurt von Schleicher, who
had served as Germany’s chancellor immediately before Hitler, was killed for allegedly
plotting to remove Hitler and return to power the exiled emperor, Wilhelm II. Heinrich
Klausener, leader of a so-called Catholic Action Party, was also killed, as were “Karl
Ernst, former Storm Troop commander at Berlin, and Gregor Strasser, former organizer
of the Nazi Party.”361
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While true in a general sense, the Newsweek story was inaccurate in numerous
details. One of the first carefully researched historical accounts of the purge by Gordon
Craig confirmed that “Röhm and dozens of other SA leaders were snatched from their
beds and shot without trial.”362 Craig also included others executed, including a number
“who had no connection with the SA at all: Gustav Kahr,…Gregor Strasser,…Edgar Jung
and Erich Klausener,…Kurt von Schleicher,…[and] General von Bredow.”363
Whereas Newsweek reported that, by the evening of 30 June, Papen had been
arrested and held at his home and that more than sixty Storm Troopers and their leaders
and sympathizers had been killed,364 in reality the number of dead totaled substantially
more. Nor did Newsweek or other Anglo-American media discuss the major role played
in the purge by both the German army and SS. Few in the foreign press anywhere,
perhaps because of tight controls on information in Germany implemented by the Nazi
government, realized the full implications of the “Night of the Long Knives” for
increasing the power of the SS inside Germany, for consolidating the army’s position,
and for enhancing the prospects of greater German rearmament and militarization.
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CHAPTER FOUR
1 JULY 1934 TO 16 MARCH 1935

The Aftermath in Germany
Following the “Night of the Long Knives,” The New York Times described
German citizens as full of “ever-growing anxiety.”365 The population was “stunned and
dismayed by the suddenness and brutality of…[the] killings”366 The Times reported that
there had been a few additional executions and arrests after the SA purge contributed to
the widespread fear and uncertainty. Later, historian John Wheeler-Bennett revealed that
the “slaughter [had] continued throughout the week-end.”367 According to Robert
O’Neill, most Germans were not certain what had occurred. News and information was
tightly regulated by the Nazi government.368
Other historians, including Holger Herwig, have viewed the German response to
the purge differently. He termed the upheaval “a milestone as the first state-planned and
legalized mass slaughter of the Third Reich.”369 Few Germans, Herwig and other scholars
have maintained, seemed alarmed either by the killings or by Hitler’s proclamation
shortly after that he was the “supreme judge” in Germany. Nor did many Germans view
the purge as a revelation of the murderous potential of National Socialism. Following the
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purge, reports smuggled abroad by socialist informants in Germany observed that “Hitler
undoubtedly still had as much support among the majority of the people as he did
before.”370
Herwig explained that “Hitler emerged as the real winner of the Night of the Long
Knives…[because] he had removed the threat from the Left (SA) and the Right
(army).”371 As a result, Hitler consolidated his power quickly. No one stood in his way
any longer because “potential opponents of the regime could now be certain of their
fate.”372
According to The Washington Post, Hitler had made plans for a national radio
address scheduled for 11 July to defend the “Night of the Long Knives.” In the speech,
Hitler blasted the foreign press for “slander” in how it had presented the SA purge and
claimed that Germany was not in a crisis. He announced that he had also convened a
meeting of the Reichstag for its support of the purge.373 Historian Richard Evans
interpreted the speech as explaining that the purge was necessary for a “clean-up of
dangerous and degenerate elements in the Nazi movement.”374 Röhm and several other
leading SA commanders were known homosexuals. However, the allusion by Hitler to
such matters was merely to reassure the fearful German public. The destruction of much
of the SA leadership involved nothing but a power struggle within the Nazi government
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and armed forces. The only “dangerous and degenerate elements” were those that posed a
threat to Hitler—not Germany.
On 13 July, The Manchester Guardian and The New York Times covered the
Reichstag meeting. The parliament, now merely a rubber stamp for Hitler, met to listen to
Hitler’s speech on the purge and how it had foiled a mutiny by Röhm.375 Richard Evans,
in his 2005 book, The Third Reich in Power, observed how the speech included “an
elaborate and fantastic web of claims and assertions about the supposed conspiracy to
overthrow the Reich.”376 According to Hitler, the alleged coup included “Communist
street fighters,…political leaders who had never reconciled themselves to the finality of
30 January 1933, rootless elements who believed in permanent revolution, and upperclass ‘drones.’”377 Hitler explained that the purge had been a method of last resort to save
Germany. Upon hearing the speech, the Reichstag enthusiastically approved Hitler’s
actions.378 Hitler’s speech restated the supposed threat the Nazi regime had faced and
how the matter was handled, and serving also to reassure the German public and to
continue building support for Hitler and his government.
In the days following the Reichstag speech, the British and American press
reported on the post-purge fate of the SA. The SA was restructured. Many officers were
reassigned or demoted in an effort to weaken SA morale and the organization itself. There
were also reports that the SA rank and file would be reduced drastically to weaken the SA
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further.379 Historians have noted that “the SA ceased to have any important function
within the state apart from tasks of local administration, propaganda, and administration
of ex-servicemen.”380 In an 18 July speech, as recorded in The New York Times, Hitler
told the army that he knew he could “depend upon [it] as the sole arms-bearer of the
State; [and he could] promise that it can always depend upon [him].”381 The German
army was still the nation’s official military force and faced no more competition or threat
from the SA as the latter’s power and influence had been destroyed.
The Expansion of Hitler’s Power
July 1934 ended with the execution of Engelbert Dollfuss, chancellor of Austria,
by Austrian Nazis. On 25 July, Anglo-American newspapers reported that Austrian Nazis
had taken control of the Austrian chancellery and shot Dollfuss. The executioners then
demanded asylum to Germany, which the German government granted only to rescind
shortly thereafter.382 Although Dollfuss was executed, historians agreed the attempted
coup failed because the Austrian government remained in tact and continued to function,
and the Austrian military did not revolt.383
The press reports revealed that there were two major concerns of European
political leaders about Dollfuss’s assassination. First, there was the possibility that the
German government could seize control of Austria and attempt an Anschluss, or a union
379
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with the neighboring German country.384 Such a uniting of the two states had been
expressly prohibited by the Versailles Treaty. Other European leaders believed that
Dollfuss’s assassination would eventually lead to war over the fear of a possible
Anschluss. The British and French governments worried that such a union would result in
a stronger and more powerful Germany. Propaganda supporting an Anschluss had
intensified in Austria.385 Historian Gordon Craig noted that such anxiety about a possible
Anschluss prompted Hitler’s quick attempts to calm the European leadership. In a
meeting with Mussolini, Hitler tried to convince the Italian leader “that the anschluss
question was not acute.”386 The Italian leader feared that an Anschluss could lead to Nazi
demands that the predominantly German South Tyrol, in northern Italy, be placed under
German rule. Craig also noted that many European leaders were suspicious of “Hitler’s
complicity in these events [the Dollfuss assassination and the Anschluss], despite his
elaborate disclaimers.” European officials remained concerned about an Austro-German
union, despite its prohibition in the Versailles Treaty and Hitler’s promises. With
instability in the Austrian government and Hitler’s untrustworthiness and mounting
power, it was only a matter of time until the Anschluss actually occurred.
At the beginning of August 1934, news that German President Paul von
Hindenburg was gravely ill and dying made international headlines. There was
speculation as to who would become his successor. The Washington Post noted Hitler
was the likely successor to von Hindenburg because of Hitler’s support among the
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German people and his backing by an almost wholly Nazi cabinet.387 The Manchester
Guardian suggested two possibilities for successors for the German presidency. The first
was Erwin Bamke, chief justice of the German supreme court. The Guardian article
speculated that Bamke might serve temporarily until elections could be held. The other
possibility was Germany’s foreign minister, Konstantin von Neurath. There were many
German citizens and government officials who believed von Neurath would be
“awarded” the presidency because of his longtime loyalty to President von
Hindenburg.388
Wheeler-Bennett has explained that German government officials had known for
months von Hindenburg had been ill and dying, and yet there was no plan of succession.
As the newspapers had reported, much speculation existed about who would become the
new president of Germany.389 Several names, in fact, emerged as replacements for the
deceased president, but “all were agreed in not wishing Hitler to succeed as Head of the
State,…[s]ome favored the immediate restoration of the Monarchy, others favored an
intermediary stage in which von Blomberg [the German defense minister] should be
appointed.”390 The uncertainty about von Hindenburg’s successor hardly illustrated
irresolution in the direction of the German state. While the foreign press speculated about
the succession, Hitler had, in reality, no serious competition.
On the morning of 2 August 1934, von Hindenburg died. The Manchester
Guardian reported that “within an hour [of von Hindenburg’s death] the Government
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announced a new law uniting the offices of President and Chancellor and appointing
Hitler to the joint post for an unlimited term.”391 Hitler was the successor.
Later, Gordon Craig explained how Hitler “abolished the title Reichspräsident
and designated himself Führer und Reichskanzler…to lay the basis for a claim that
Hitler’s authority had greater legitimacy than that of any of his predecessors.”392 The
Manchester Guardian noted further that a plebiscite would be held on 19 August for the
German electorate to approve officially Hitler’s appointment.393 The plebiscite
demonstrated that the German people had given their near unanimous consent and
approval of Hitler as Germany’s all powerful dictator.
Hitler’s succession to the German presidency exacerbated the fear of war already
widespread in many European nations. The New York Times and The Washington Post
reported that the British government had viewed von Hindenburg as a means of stability
in Germany and check on Hitler’s power. The French government had agreed and
believed that war was now likely. That direction was especially clear to London and Paris
after Hitler required the German army and navy to take an oath of allegiance to him. This
was a further solidification of his power in the state and his control over the military.
President von Hindenburg, it was noted, did not require such an oath of allegiance to him
from the German military.394 To the French, Hitler was now “the personification of the
menacing German war machine.”395
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London and Paris were rightfully fearful. The new oath of allegiance was a
“pledge to unconditional obedience to Hitler, whether or not his commands might have
been considered legal.”396 Historians believe most of the soldiers did not fully
comprehend the meaning of this new oath. However, the soldiers were willing to give
their “unconditional obedience” because of Hitler’s support and regard for the army.397
Hitler now controlled the military. The military was no longer an instrument of the state,
but that of Hitler. It was for Hitler to use as he wished and saw fit, not for the defense of
and at the service of the state.
The Continued Struggle for Peace
Speaking at President von Hindenburg’s funeral on 6 August, Hitler declared
again that his policies were to be a continuation of von Hindenburg’s—peace.398 Despite
these assurances, Germany’s neighbors and the foreign media continued to doubt that
peace could exist. The New York Times reported that the French were particularly
doubtful of Hitler’s persistent claims that Germany wanted peace. The French did not
believe “Hitler has been consistent in the peaceful overtures he has made since coming to
power.”399 The Paris government was also concerned over many of Hitler’s assertions
written in his book, Mein Kampf, or My Struggle. The paper noted that France believed
Germany would one day unleash war against France and others as described and outlined
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in the book.400 Historian Gerhard Weinberg would observe much later that peace was
doubtful from this point onward. He described the steps needed for completing
rearmament and reinstating conscription that came with Hindenburg’s death and Hitler
becoming the supreme leader of Germany.401 Nothing stood in Hitler’s way to transform
Germany into the ultimate police and military state. The military was at Hitler’s disposal
for the implementation of his ideology brought about through war and violence.
Yes and No
Soon the Nazis began to prepare the domestic front for the plebiscite on 19
August. The Manchester Guardian noted that “every known device of propaganda will be
used…[including] leaflets, …posters,…[and] meetings.”402 The article also stated that the
Nazis planned to set up thousands of loud-speakers throughout Germany to broadcast
propaganda speeches and programs. This would enable the broadcasts to be heard by all
Germans and portray Hitler favorably. The Nazis had additional schemes to use the
Storm Troopers and Hitler Youth to round up Germans who refused to vote. The Nazi
groups would force unwilling Germans to go to the polls and cast ballots.403
On 19 August, the British press reported just over 43 million of the 45 million in
the German electorate had gone to the polls. About 38 million German citizens voted to
affirm Hitler as president and chancellor of Germany, while over 4 million voted against
the measure. Almost 600,000 votes were invalid due to the failure to mark the ballots,
despite that the German public had been instructed on voting procedures. The invalid
400
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votes were “regarded as adverse votes”404 for Hitler. With the overwhelmingly favorable
results of the election, Richard Evans explained that “with this act, Hitler became Head of
State in every sense of the term.”405
According to analysts in the American press, Britain and France realized that “the
object of the plebiscite is too obvious…[and] too clumsy to impress any one outside of
Germany.”406 Additionally, the London and Paris governments focused almost
exclusively on the four million votes cast against Hitler. London was pleased that “so
many voters would have the courage to withstand the terrific propaganda…[and] the
possible consequences of voting ‘No’.”407 For the French government, the 4 million “no”
votes were interpreted as “indicating a stronger undercurrent of discontent”408 than
previously thought.
While most of Europe viewed the plebiscite in terms of the number of votes
against Hitler or dismissed the validity of the referendum, Hitler received nearly eighty
percent of the vote. Regardless of how one interpreted the results of the plebiscite,
Hitler’s leadership was affirmed by it. The plebiscite had done its job in showcasing
Hitler’s support within Germany and legitimizing his newly held office.
Investigations into German Military Strength
At the beginning of September 1934, articles about tension existing in the Saar
region dominated the Anglo-American newspapers. The latter reported that many Saar
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residents were becoming increasingly uneasy and tense when the German army began
“providing military training for 16,000 German residents…in preparation for the
plebiscite”409 scheduled for January 1935. Under supervision of the League of Nations,
Saarlanders would vote on whether they wished to return to German rule. The
Manchester Guardian explained that the military service and training were voluntary and
would last until the plebiscite.410 Even with such reassurances, fear of a German military
presence was not easily deterred.
Historians have explained that the military presence in the Saar region was a part
of German preparations for the January 1935 plebiscite.411 Saarlanders believed “rumors
put about by the ‘yes’ campaign…to believe that the ballot would not be secret…[and]
those known to vote ‘no’ would be carted off to concentration camps.”412 Fear was a
means of influencing the plebiscite. The military was there to remind Saarlanders of the
supposed consequences for not voting “yes” in the plebiscite.
In mid-September 1934, the annual Nazi Party rally in Nuremberg showcased
large German military celebrations and marches. The Manchester Guardian estimated
over 100,000 troops participated in a parade at the Luitpold Arena, followed by an
inspection and short speech by Hitler, the first of several Hitler would deliver in the sixday event.413 In his address, Hitler briefly reiterated the significance of the SA purge on
30 June. The rally was also attended by officers from all of the branches of the German
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military as well as over 50,000 civilian spectators.414 One historian described the
Nuremberg rally as “restoring pageantry and color and mysticism to the drab lives of
twentieth-century Germans.”415 The final day featured “an effective display” of arms and
cavalry marches by the Reichswehr.”416 These exhibitions consisted of “large displays of
equipment and tactical procedure, marching and drill displays and…spectacular
demonstrations of pyrotechnics and searchlight.”417 This party rally was best known for
its stunning visual propaganda, captured in Leni Riefenstahl’s film Triumph of the Will.
Upon the suggestion of the young architect friend of Hitler, Albert Speer, Hitler had
approved the use at the rally of 130 anti-aircraft searchlights, which during the night sent
their beams skyward, thus producing the first—in Speer’s words much later, in his
postwar memoirs—“cathedral of light…not only my most beautiful architectural concept,
but…the only one which has survived the passage of time.”418 After the rally had ended,
The New York Times observed that the “streets were loud with laughter, song and cries of
‘Heil Hitler.”419
The Nuremberg rally was a display of German power and military might. It was a
“pep rally” to build support and garner enthusiasm among the German population for
Hitler and the Nazi government. It was a demonstration of German military power for
those watching around the world.
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Press coverage shifted quickly back to foreign concerns about German
rearmament, and especially about Germany’s alleged possession of military aircraft. The
New York Times ran a story that US Congressional reports and hearings revealed
“Germany had assembled a sizable mystery fleet of war planes.”420 Parts for the aircraft
were allegedly smuggled in through sea ports and then assembled into functioning
military aircraft. Speculation existed that parts came from the United States and Great
Britain, but no facts were presented to substantiate the claim.421
Days later, United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) officials testified before Congress
that their company had provided Germany with plane engines and other minor parts. The
Washington Post reported that UAC officials claimed they believed the “equipment sold
to Germany was delivered in belief it would be used for commercial purposes.”422 Other
UAC officials testified that “approval of United States Government officials was in every
case obtained”423 prior to the shipments to Germany. They believed that the shipments
were not in violation of the Treaty of Versailles.424
The German government responded to the investigation and hearings. The Nazi
authorities claimed that all purchases were for commercial purposes and were made with
the approval of the United States government. Because the parts purchases were
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supposedly for commercial activities, Berlin stressed the Treaty of Versailles did not
prohibit such use—only military use.425
Germany did have ties to aerial armament manufacturers and military technology
in the United States. Throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s, German military officers
and other officials had paid repeated visits to air corps flight schools and aerial
engineering schools and industries in the United States. Such officials had opportunities
to fly aircraft and study manuals on military aircraft.426 Wilhelm Deist has noted that
between January 1934 and July 1935 German military aircraft “output [increased] fourfold in a relatively short time.”427 Germany’s connections to foreign military industries
and armament manufacturers contributed to the increase. The nature of such foreign visits
indicated, despite Germany’s claims, that they were for the purpose of creating and
building an air force. If all the purchases had been for “commercial use,” German
officials would not have visited military flight schools and industries.
Following the uproar over the German purchase of aircraft parts, according to The
New York Times, Hitler sent a letter to a London newspaper reiterating again that “the
sincere desire of Germany [is] for peaceful relations with all its neighbors.”428 The article
concluded that Hitler’s letter did nothing to combat Britain’s anti-German sentiments and
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fear. Most British citizens believed their country was preparing for war against
Germany.429
The Spread of Nazism
In early October 1934, The Manchester Guardian and The New York Times noted
that the Nazi government had extended its influence in Austria by sending there Franz
von Papen as Germany’s minister to the Vienna government. While the Germans claimed
to want peaceful diplomatic relations, some Austrians were skeptical and saw this as the
beginning of the Anschluss. The Austrian government agreed to keep the lines of
diplomatic communication open and allow “moderate” German Nazis to serve in political
organizations in Austria. Meanwhile, the Austrian government secured from Berlin the
promise of an “independent Austria”—meaning no Anschluss.430
Historians agree the appointment of von Papen as a diplomat to Austria by Hitler
was to “pour oil on the troubled waters of Austro-German relations.”431 Yet von Papen
had been a friend of Engelbert Dollfuss.432 The aristocratic, conservative, and Catholic
von Papen, well-known in Europe and a former German chancellor, had collaborated in
1933 in helping Hitler into power. He had served as vice chancellor in the Nazi
government, but was removed from his post after the Röhm purge because he had called
publicly for greater freedom for Germany and possibly a return of the monarchy. By fall
1934, von Papen collaborated again with the Nazis, this time by agreeing to be German
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minister to Austria. His appointment was designed to help allay suspicions that Hitler had
been involved in the assassination of Dollfuss and to improve diplomatic relations
between Austria and Germany. However, at least some Austrians were rightfully
skeptical because von Papen’s appointment would eventually, four years later, “see that
the Anschluss was brought about peacefully.”433 The Anschluss had been in Hitler’s
plans. The heavily Catholic and conservative Austria would likely be more receptive to it
because of widespread Austrian fondness for von Papen.
Beginning in November 1934, the Anglo-American newspapers began to reflect
Europeans’ renewed fears of German rearmament and possible war over the Saar region.
The New York Times noted rumors that the Nazi government planned a coup in the
Saar.434 According to The Washington Post with the January 1935 Saar plebiscite still
months away, France became increasingly concerned about an armed Nazi takeover of
the region.435 If the Saar region voted to become a part of Germany again, the latter
would then become an even closer neighbor to France and pose a greater threat.
According to The New York Times, French Foreign Minister Pierre Laval met
with Germany’s ambassador to Paris, Roland Koester, following Germany’s reassurance
that “there would be no invasion of the Saar territory from Germany.”436 Laval explained
that France was merely fulfilling its “international obligations connected with the League
of Nations,”437 and Koester “expressed his government’s sentiments…[and] did not
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intend in any manner to disregard the conditions fixed by treaty to assure a free Saar
vote.”438 There seemed to be mutual understanding between the two diplomats and was
Laval’s goal. He was “interested in improving German-French relations.”439 Bettering
relations between the two countries would become even more important as tension over
the Saar region mounted until the plebiscite. An improved relationship between the two
nations hopefully meant that the international tension and fear of war would be resolved.
The amicable understanding, however, was short lived. The New York Times
revealed that after Laval and Koester met, the German government announced “an
official German protest against the use of French troops to safeguard law and order…in
the Saar Basin territory.”440 Laval defended France’s position and believed the French
had the right to maintain troops in the Saar region under the League of Nations’ mandate.
Laval further claimed that officials in the Saar region had requested additional forces to
safeguard against the Germans.441
There were merits to Laval’s claims, based on reports in The Washington Post
that the Germans had “armed forces working secretly in the Saar Basin for the territory’s
annexation to Germany.”442 According to the Post, there were an estimated 10,000 secret
German police officers stationed in the Saar who were “terrorizing Saarlanders believed
to be opposed to joining Germany…[by] using extreme methods to promote the German
cause.”443 These methods included “trying to kidnap anti-Nazis,…provoking frequent
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disturbances, [and the threat of] reprisals after the plebiscite.”444 Later, historians agreed
with the newspaper reports, one noting that “in many parts of the Saarland, the local Nazi
Party exerted massive intimidation and violence behind the scenes to deter the opposition
from voting against reunification with Germany.”445 French troops were present in the
Saar region to maintain order and give some legitimacy to the forthcoming plebiscite.
Security provided by the French troops would act as a counterbalance to the violence and
intimidation of Nazi forces.
By 18 November, however, tension between France and Germany subsided when
Hitler announced that Germany would “‘accept the result of the plebiscite, whatever it
may be.’”446 The Manchester Guardian revealed that Hitler encouraged both France and
Germany to come to a mutual understanding. He repeated that Germany had no intentions
of forcibly taking the Saar region or overthrowing its government.447 For now, the threat
of war over the Saar region appeared ended.
More on Armaments
By the end of November 1934, the issue of German rearmament emerged again as
a worry of the international community. The Times and The Washington Post discovered
that there was a deal that would allow Germany to rejoin the Disarmament Conference
and return to the negotiating table. The stipulation was that the German government had
to admit it had been rearming, but the deal fell through. The only things the German
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government claimed it was doing were seeking peace and arms for defense.448 Gerhard
Weinberg explained “the efforts to revive disarmament negotiations [would have been] a
failure”449 regardless. Germany was already heavily rearmed, and military conscription
was planned to begin again.450
The press also reported that the French found themselves in a panic over the
strength of the Nazi military forces. The Anglo-American newspapers reported that
France claimed Germany had an “army” of about 5.5 million troops. Paris asserted that
German troop strength consisted of both standing forces, such as the Reichwehr, the
police, and auxiliary forces, and of massive reserve cadres, that included veterans,
paramilitary organizations, young adults in pro-Nazi or pro-Hitler organizations, and
traditional military and police reserves.451 Reports of French intelligence, however, were
not entirely accurate. Plans were implemented in the autumn of 1934 for the expansion of
the German army. This would include reserve forces, like those published in the press.
However, troop strength was hardly 5.5 million in November 1934. By February 1935,
troop levels in the army stood at just under 300,000. Only by 1939, when war began
between Germany and Poland, were there about 4 million German army troops.452
Moreover, during the autumn and winter of 1934, on direct orders from both
Hitler and the German foreign ministry, great caution was pursued by the Germans in
448
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regard to a number of their armament plans, so as to avoid endangering the political
outcome of the imminent Saar plebiscite. Consequently, continued French fears about
German military forces were not without basis. According to Deist, “it was now to be
expected that the success in the Saar would cause the political leadership, i.e. Hitler, to
re-emphasize the rearmament plans of the services and thus again start the acceleration
process driven by political, military-organizational, and operational considerations.”453
The New York Times, The Times (London), and The Washington Post all reported
that France was concerned about German rearmament in other military branches. The
French government projected that Germany had between 1,000 to 1,100 military aircraft
at its disposal.454 France was also alarmed because such German aircraft were “swifter
and more modern” than France’s “less swift and less modern” fleet.455
In the case of such numbers of planes, the French and the press underestimated
Germany. The latter already had numerous flight training schools and was in the process
of training officers for different positions such as pilots, bombers, and navigation. These
newly trained officers would need planes to fly. By May 1934, Germany had at least a
thousand military aircraft. There were also plans to produce another four thousand planes
by late 1934 and early 1935. Throughout 1934, the Germans produced several types of
reconnaissance aircraft, such as those by Heinkel, the He 45 and He 46. Fighter aircraft,
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including the Arado 65 and the He 51, were being manufactured, as were the bombers,
the He 50, the Junkers 52, and the Dornier 11.456
Furthermore, by the end of 1933, the German army and navy had begun
contributing to the personnel build-up of the air force (Luftwaffe). Over two hundred
officers up to the rank of colonel had been transferred to the air force, and, in January
1934, an additional seventy had followed. In addition, some 1,600 non-commissioned
officers had been transferred. At the beginning of 1934, a large number of young civilian
pilots also joined the Luftwaffe. After 1934, the air force took over its own recruiting, but
its personnel were still trained in units and schools of the army and navy.457 Historian
James Corum stated that the “Luftwaffe [had] succeeded in [its] objective of rapidly
expanding.”458 Consequently, by the end of 1934, Germany had already expanded its air
force on a large scale and, unknown to—but occasionally suspected by—the outside
world, posed a credible threat to Europe.
According to The New York Times Berlin had grown tired of Paris’s claims. The
Nazi government accused France of “attempt[ing] to poison the wells of public opinion in
Germany’s disfavor…[and]…creating a war-panicky atmosphere in Europe.”459 The
German government restated that war was not its ambition, nor could it wage war
because of the supposed “inadequacy of [its] national defense.”460 France had reason not
to trust Germany. The latter’s response only hastened the passage of France’s military
budget for 1935. It included “increased aviation development… [and] stronger, light
456
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warships,”461 in addition to funding the restructuring and reorganization of the armaments
industry and manufacturers. The increases in France’s military budget were illustrative of
the threat of war Germany appeared to the French to pose to them and the rest of Europe.
The Prospects of Peace?
At the beginning of December, in a speech before the Chamber of Deputies,
French foreign minister Pierre Laval made clear France’s position on Germany. In his
address, which was reported on by the Anglo-American press, Laval stated that France
must remain strong militarily to insure peace in Europe and the world. France’s
immediate goals were to preserve and defend the sovereignty of other European states
and to refuse to accept Germany’s desire to rearm. Laval also challenged Germany to
demonstrate through its actions, and not merely its words, that it meant peace.462 German
diplomats met with Laval. The New York Times and The Washington Post indicated that
the envoys tried to explain to Laval that Germany was merely misunderstood in the
international community. Germany’s goals were peace and equality. The diplomats
sought, the papers reported, to reassure Laval that Germany was not capable of waging
war against France or anyone else.463
With the Saar plebiscite approaching quickly, old fears regarding it continued to
exist especially that Germany might influence the vote, attempt a coup, or take the Saar
by force. There had been much debate throughout 1934 in the international community
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about what to do with the Saar. First reported in early December 1934 in The Manchester
Guardian and The New York Times, Germany had finally agreed to accept League of
Nations troops stationed in the Saar. However, Berlin responded that the troops were
unnecessary because Germany had claimed it would respect the sovereignty of the Saar
and the results of the plebiscite.464 Germany’s willingness to accept the League of
Nations troops as monitors of the referendum eased tensions and sent a wave of optimism
across Europe. By the end of December, a force of about 4,000 League of Nations
soldiers was stationed in the Saar. The troops were from Britain, Italy, the Netherlands,
and Sweden. Even with such forces in the Saar, tension remained high in anticipation of
the plebiscite.465 However, the troops were necessary, according to one French diplomat
quoted in The New York Times, obviously expressing the serious French concern over
German rearmament, or else “there might easily have been a war.”466
Laval was doing his job by acting in the best interest of France’s national security
and for peace throughout Europe. He forced Germany to act and accept League troops
stationed in the Saar region.467 For the time being, diplomacy worked; at least
momentarily, tensions and fears were quieted.
Whether it was the Christmas spirit, or looking toward the easing of tension after
the upcoming Saar plebiscite, or the hope for future, peaceful international relations, the
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outlook of some in the British and American press for 1935 was optimistic. An article in
The New York Times testified to the fact that peace
remains somewhat of a mystery....The fear has left us. The
fear inspired by the menace of German armaments is no
longer…As if by magic, for the time being at least, it has
disappeared. It may return of course.468
1935
With the arrival of the new year, there were renewed efforts to bring Germany
back into the international community. In February 1935, the British government had
planned to resume the Geneva Disarmament Conference. According to The Manchester
Guardian, The New York Times, and The Washington Post, Britain had hoped that France
and Italy could convince Germany to return to the conference. The plan was for France to
settle whatever differences it had with Germany, to allow Germany some degree of
rearmament, and for Germany to reenter the League of Nations. 469 February, it was
thought, would be a prime month to attempt to resume negotiations and the Disarmament
Conference. The Saar region had been a point of contention among Britain, France, and
Germany, but once the plebiscite had occurred, the issue would be off the table, and these
countries could engage in other discussions. Historian Gerhard Weinberg’s conclusions
pointed to the fact that Britain and France both had “hopes for a relaxation of tension
after the Saar plebiscite.”470
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The grand plans of the Anglo-French were short-lived. With the Saar plebiscite
only days away, The New York Times reported that an anxious German government
refused London’s proposals. The British government thought the rejection reflected
Germans’ concern about their future influence on the Saar region, regardless of the
outcome of the plebiscite. The British alleged that the German government believed if it
rejoined the League of Nations, German power and influence in Europe, including in the
Saar, would be curtailed. As it had always believed, Berlin thought any rearmament
would be conditional and assumed that Britain and France would demand something
from Germany in exchange for allowing it to rearm.471
The Saar Plebiscite
Emotions ran high throughout Europe prior to the Saar plebiscite. The Washington
Post believed that the best outcome would be for the region to return to Germany. If the
Saar returned to Germany, “tension between France and Germany can be
lessened…[since] the tension which has kept Europe jittery…would be greatly
relieved.”472 France was prepared for the Saar to pass again under German rule. The
Times reported that Paris was ready militarily should a crisis or situation warrant military
intervention. The French also anticipated a large number of refugees from the Saar region
to arrive in France if the Saar became part of Germany.473 The New York Times revealed
that the Germans were certain that “after fifteen years of foreign slavery, the Saar will
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return to the open arms of Mother Germany.”474 Apparently The New York Times was
right. The Saarlanders were Germans and did not like being under French control. The
newspaper observed that the Saarlanders had been “discriminated heavily against…[and
had their] language and culture [suppressed].”475 As a result, Germans were “preparing to
celebrate a great victory in…[the] plebiscite.”476
The plebiscite, held on 13 January 1935, produced much celebrating in Germany.
According to the Anglo-American newspapers, Saarlanders voted overwhelmingly for
reunification with Germany. About 476,000 voted to reunify with Germany; about 2,000
voted to unify with France; and about 46,000 voted to remain under the League of
Nations.477 That was not to say there were no allegations of German propaganda
influencing the Saarlanders, of intimidation of voters by Nazi officials, and of the
attempted swaying of votes with money.478 Despite the outcome of the plebiscite, the
Anglo-American press reported that the League of Nations remained optimistic about
future European relations. Its results were accepted unanimously. The League also set 1
March 1935 as the official date of transfer of the Saar from control of the League to
Germany.479
True Intentions
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With the fate of the Saar safely determined, it seemed that finally peace was at
hand. By the end of January, however, news reports gave a different impression. Around
25 January, Hermann Göring traveled to Warsaw, Poland, supposedly for a hunting
expedition. The Manchester Guardian and The Times indicated that the real purpose of
the trip was to discuss German rearmament with Polish officials. Göring, the papers
claimed, was attempting to convince Poland to allow Germany to rearm.480
What were Germany’s true intentions? Prior to Göring’s visit to Poland,
according to historian Weinberg, “Hitler indicated that…Germany would take an
important step in the field of armaments…, either the announcement of air rearmament or
the reintroduction of conscription, or both.”481 Germany had already been rearming and
there was no stopping it. Berlin did not believe it needed permission from any nation to
rearm. Therefore, Göring’s visit to Poland was likely to inform the Poles that the German
government was about to announce its rearmament and to reassure the Poles they had
nothing to fear.
On 29 and 30 January, The Manchester Guardian and The New York Times
published a series of articles on military conscription in Germany. The press indicated
that universal conscription would soon occur in Germany. The newspapers claimed
Germany had reached a point politically and militarily where conscription was possible.
One German military officer was quoted as saying that conscription was necessary for a
large, strong military, unlike that of Wilhelm II’s regime and the Weimar Republic. The
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new, stronger military would secure Germany’s existence as a nation. With compulsory
enlistment, the military would include more capable and competent men in its ranks than
the few select men that had voluntarily joined under previous regimes and
governments.482
Rearmament
As February 1935 began, British and French governments remained worried
about January’s reports of German military conscription. To further the anxiety, new
claims appeared in the press that Hitler was contemplating whether to reveal the full
extent of Germany’s “secret” rearmament. Hitler believed the timing to be right because
the “Reich’s foreign political position…[was] sufficiently fortified to risk a formal public
admission of German rearmament.”483
The Manchester Guardian, The New York Times, and The Times (London) all
reported that British and French statesmen were in a scramble to figure out how to deal
with Germany. The British and French prime ministers, MacDonald and Pierre-Etienne
Flandin, and foreign ministers, Simon and Laval, held an emergency meeting in London.
There they discussed what the real plans of Germany might be, the possibility of war, and
negotiating a possible peace agreement.484 On 4 February, after the three day meeting, the
major Anglo-American newspapers indicated that the British and French ministers had
decided to allow Germany to rearm, effectively ending the armament restriction clauses
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of the Versailles Treaty. There were certain terms to which Germany had to agree,
however. If it wanted permission to rearm, Berlin had to return to the Disarmament
Conference and League of Nations, and participate in a mutual aerial defense pact with
Belgium, Britain, France, and Italy.485 Additional conditions, not published in the
newspapers, included “controlling air warfare and certain types of weapons, [and] cooperation in new mutual assistance plans to give security to Eastern and Central
Europe.”486
For a couple of reasons, Britain and France made concessions to Germany. First,
allowing the Germans to rearm conditionally removed the international tension the
armaments issue had caused among the nations. Placing conditions on the armaments
made certain Britain and France were still able to exercise some control over what
armaments Germany could or could not have. Second, Britain and France knew Germany
had already been secretly rearming. There was nothing they could do to stop the
rearmament, short of going to war. The latter was not an option Britain or France wanted.
If they could not stop what the Germans were already doing, they had might as well
permit it.
The Times described Germany’s initial reaction to the British and French proposal
as having “aroused interest…[and creating] a basis of discussion.”487 On 5 February, The
Washington Post revealed that “Hitler…told the British Ambassador, Sir Eric Phipps,
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that Germany will discuss armaments and her return to Geneva.”488 The British saw
Germany’s willingness to discuss the proposal as an opportunity to push Berlin to accept
it. London threatened several reprisals if Germany did not accept the proposal, including
that Germany would face political and military isolation in Europe and the world.489
The Times reported that Hitler had retreated to his Bavarian mountain home for
several days with advisers to analyze the proposal.490 Britain and France remained
optimistic and believed Germany’s reply would be “in friendly and conciliatory terms
and imply a substantial measure of acceptance.”491
Germany replied on 15 February, but it was not what Britain had hoped for. The
Manchester Guardian, The New York Times, and The Washington Post reported that
Germany agreed to the mutual aerial defense pact, but showed little interest in a return to
the Disarmament Conference or the League of Nations. Apparently in keeping with
Hitler’s effort to divide Britain from France in diplomatic relations, Berlin also demanded
direct talks and negotiations with London, not Paris.492 The British government was
angry—angry because Germany wanted its rearmament recognized by the European
powers without accepting the proposal493 and angry that Germany sought to, in the words
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of The New York Times, “attempt to drive a wedge between them [Britain and
France].”494
Germany was willing to engage in talks with British and French diplomats, but
was not willing to accept any “limiting the extent of German armaments or imposing
international controls or inspection.”495 In what should not have been a surprise, the Nazi
government had been leading the British and the French along the whole time. This
demonstrated Germany had never been interested in any of the Western Powers’
proposals unless it got everything it wanted, which was full rearmament.
On 1 March 1935, the Saar region returned officially to Germany. While France
and the League of Nations had hoped for a quiet transfer ceremony of the Saar, there was
much celebrating in Germany and the Saar according to The Manchester Guardian and
The Washington Post. Schools were closed throughout both regions. Saarlanders flew
German flags and parades were held for the “Liberation Day.”496 With the Saar returned
to Germany, this brought “to [a] close one of the most hotly contested chapters of the
Versailles Treaty.”497
The transfer had occurred peacefully. The historian Richard Evans interpreted the
return of the Saar region as “a great day for Germany [because] it showed the power and
popularity of the Third Reich and its ideas for all Germans.”498 Germans and Saarlanders
certainly believed it was a significant day, evident from all of the celebrations. Britain,
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France, and the remainder of Europe, however, could only look on; there was nothing
they could do. The plebiscite favored the Germans. The transfer occurred. The Nazi
regime had more support than what most other nations in Europe wanted or expected.
The New York Times reported on 2 and 4 March that Hitler had once again
asserted that Germany was a peaceful nation. He believed that all the European nations
wanted peace and that this common ground they shared would further diplomacy and
friendly relations. According to the newspaper, these peaceful overtures could not have
come at a more convenient time, with the impending visit to Berlin of British Foreign
Minister John Simon. The Nazi government remained optimistic that the diplomatic
meeting would further German ambitions of rearmament. As the date of the meeting
neared, the French expressed anger that Germany still did not want to meet with any of
their leaders. However, it was the Germans that arranged the meeting with the British in
mid-February. France’s anger over the issue was now the wedge that the British had been
afraid of when this meeting was initially formalized.499
On 7 March, Hitler and Simon were to confer, but Hitler suddenly canceled the
meeting. According to The Washington Post, Hitler refused to meet with Simon after
learning the British government had publicly “defended…[its] armament increases and
criticized German rearmament as endangering the continent’s peace.”500 This gave the
Germans a reason to bring up the issue of armaments equality again—either the European
nations disarm or allow Germany to rearm. An article in The New York Times described
499
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that Germany was “fed up with the practice of being held up to the world as a perennial
offender, and she was determined to put an end to that practice.”501
Germany did “put an end to that practice.” On 11 March, Berlin alerted Britain
and Italy that it once again had an air force. It was on this date that “Germany’s civilian
‘air sports’ association was placed under direct order of the Reichswehr… becoming part
…of the Reich’s defensive forces.”502 The Manchester Guardian and The Washington
Post revealed that Hermann Göring would serve as the commanding officer of the
Luftwaffe. The new air force was estimated to have up to a hundred thousand trained men
and would be divided into five regional command centers.503
The media reported that French citizens were concerned over the “grave”
situation and panicked at the thought of “German revenge.”504 The French government
assessed its options. France had planned to “notify Germany…that her proposed ‘official’
air force constituted a clear violation of the Versailles Treaty.”505 This notification would
then allow France to prevent Germany “from giving her air force official status.”506
However, the French had a problem. Before Germany’s public admission of the
establishment of the Luftwaffe, the French government had known that Germany had
been secretly rearming and creating its air force. Yet the French government had not
acted then to oppose it and would not get another chance to do so now.
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On 16 March 1935, the Anglo-American press reported that Germany had
shocked Europe and the world with two formal announcements: that Germany would
introduce general military conscription and that it was repudiating the armaments clauses
of the Versailles Treaty. The new German army force would have about thirty-six
divisions. Military experts throughout Europe estimated the strength of the German force
to be anywhere from 300,000 to 500,000 men. Within ten years time, experts believed,
Germany could have an army of over three million men.507
According to The New York Times, Hitler considered his actions justified. He
claimed that Germany had disarmed previously, with the expectation that the other
European states would do likewise. He alleged that Britain and France had not disarmed,
but instead had increased their armaments. This left Germany vulnerable to attack. Hitler
maintained that Germany had done all that had been asked of it and all that it could do to
pursue peace, but that Britain and France had not done the same. The only option left was
to rearm, as he said, “not…for warlike attack, but exclusively for defense and thereby for
the maintenance of peace.”508
The surprise announcements from Germany resonated throughout Europe. But
there was little or nothing Europe could do now. On 17 March, Britain, France, Italy, and
the Soviet Union held an emergency meeting to discuss the German situation. The only
solutions the European powers were able to produce were economic and security pacts,
retaking the Rhineland from Germany, and “protesting” at Geneva. The viability of any
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of these offerings was slim because “France believed [them] unthinkable…[and] Britain
desired to avoid entanglement”509 out of fear of becoming involved militarily.
According to The New York Times and The Washington Post, the Soviet Union seemed to
be the only country that understood the true gravity of the situation. It believed that
Germany was eventually preparing to wage war, not maintain peaceful defense. The
Russians, who had been ignored by the Western Powers in the past in negotiations on
German rearmament, thought that the German war machine would expand toward
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.510 The latter urged Britain and France to respond
forcefully and resolutely to Germany if they were “interested in the preservation of
peace.”511
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION

During the first months of 1935, Hitler had achieved his initial significant
victories in foreign affairs. In January, the plebiscite in the Saar region had delivered
Germany an overwhelming triumph and reunited the area with the Reich. Then in March
Germany repudiated the arms clauses of the Versailles treaty and, in doing so, alarmed
the outside world. On 16 March Hitler announced to the world that Germany would
introduce general military conscription and raise an army over five times the size allowed
by the treaty. A week earlier he had informed foreign governments that Germany once
again had an air force.
When Germany’s most important European rivals and authors of the treaty,
Britain, France, and Italy, failed to respond to the Reich’s violation of international law,
except to denounce it verbally, the Berlin government decreed on 21 May 1935, a new
military service law. The measure made “Aryan”—in Nazi jargon “Germanic” racial—
descent a nearly absolute prerequisite for entry into German military service. Already on
2 February 1934, the military had discharged all Jewish officers and soldiers. Although
the May 1935 law affected directly only those Jews who wished to enter military service,
it also formally banned Jews from the military.
Thus, by the spring of 1935, largely unknown at the time to anyone, including the
foreign world and press, Hitler and a few of his closest Nazi associates like Hermann
Göring, had taken the first successful steps toward Hitler’s ultimate goal as Germany’s
leader. Since his emergence in German politics in the 1920s, he had long envisioned that
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one day he would lead the nation in a series of wars, culminating in a massive racial war
in the East against the Slavs, primarily the Russians and their “Jewish-Bolshevik”
leadership, to seize their land for more living space. In Mein Kampf, published in 1925,
he had discussed a first war with an extremely anti-German France, a war that would
offer “the rear cover for an enlargement of our people’s living space in Europe,” acquired
by a second war against Russia.512
In 1928, in an unpublished book that discussed mainly foreign policy, Hitler had
revised his sequence of wars with the objective of gaining world domination. The first
war would be against Czechoslovakia, Germany’s closest minor enemy, which had
intimate ties to France; the second against France; the third against Russia; and a fourth
against the United States. Once in power, by 1935, Hitler gave up his illusion that a war
with Britain could be delayed until after the one with the Soviet Union.
In promising war, before he and the Nazis had seized power in Germany, Hitler
always expressed himself in explicit terms. In May 1928, he told an audience: “I believe
that I have enough energy to lead our people whither it must shed its blood, not for an
adjustment of its boundaries, but to save it into the most distant future by securing so
much land and space that the future will receive back many times the blood shed.”513
Despite the clarity of Hitler’s memoir and speeches before 1933 on his demands
for future war, few observers—whether inside or outside Germany—appeared to take the
Nazi leader’s views seriously. Few Europeans bothered to read Mein Kampf or take its
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author’s political career seriously, and many others, especially Britons, remembered all
too vividly the recent Great War and had met its terrible destruction of humanity with
widespread pacifism. Moreover, as Hitler and the Nazis took over the German
government in 1933, much of the world found itself mired in, and preoccupied with the
Great Depression. Most foreign observers found little time to concern themselves with
the rise to power in Germany of a leader who had never held an appointed or elected
office outside his own political party.
Nevertheless, as this study has shown, during 1933 and 1934 the Anglo-American
press reported extensively on Hitler’s “secret” rearmament of his nation that culminated
in the spring of 1935 with the public announcements of German rearmament. What were
Americans and Britons told in the press coverage? How accurate was the press’s
information? How well informed were Britons and Americans about the danger to peace
that the early Nazi regime posed to the world—at least by the newspaper and other print
media? What can be said in answer to such questions?
To a significant degree, the major Anglo-American newspapers—The Manchester
Guardian, The New York Times, The Times (London), and The Washington Post—and
selected American and British magazines reported extensively, accurately, and
thoroughly on the major issues and themes of Germany’s “secret” rearmament from the
time Hitler and the Nazis assumed power in January 1933 until he announced publicly in
March 1935 that Germany had begun rearming. However, did the relatively large
number of such Anglo-American press reports mean that most serious readers of the
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press could hardly have missed the reports and missed learning about the Nazis’
clandestine remilitarization of their country?
Most likely not. Overwhelmingly, as shown in the documentation of this study,
often the press printed—or buried—the articles on the suspected German rearmament,
and the resulting frequent concern about it among French and British leaders, deep inside
the newspapers and magazines.514 The placement of such articles illustrated that the press
believed—perhaps because of the ongoing Geneva Disarmament Conference, which
Germany attended—that German rearmament posed little direct danger to Britain,
France, or the United States. Even Hitler’s appointment in late January 1933 as
chancellor of Germany found little coverage in the Anglo-American press. Reporting on
the event, The Times (London) published a brief story on page 11, and The Manchester
Guardian on page 8. When the Nazi aviation commissioner, Göring, spoke repeatedly in
the following weeks about the creation of a German air force, The Times (London) noted
his initial claims in an article on page 9. Later, during the spring, The Washington Post
placed on page 13 an account of Göring’s speech to the Geneva Disarmament
Conference. In April 1933, stories appearing on pages 13 and 29 of The New York Times
reported urgently—ironic, given the placement of the articles—that Germany had
launched a pocket battleship, the Admiral Scheer, and was producing additional cruisers
for later in the year.
The American press thought that one of Hitler’s well-known predecessors as
German chancellor, Franz von Papen, who served in the Nazi regime as vice chancellor,
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deserved as much or more attention than did Hitler. In May 1933, The Washington Post
reported on its front page a public speech of Papen’s that demanded Germany be allowed
to rearm or else other European nations must disarm. A few days later, Hitler claimed in
a public address that Germany would respect the armaments and other major clauses of
the Versailles treaty. In an analysis of what Hitler said, the American magazines,
Newsweek on page 12, and The Literary Digest on pages 10 and 11, expressed distrust
and skepticism toward the speech, maintaining that it was nothing more than a “smokescreen” to be “soothing to foreign ears.”
By October 1933, such observations in the press had gained greater relevance, as
both the Disarmament Conference and world peace appeared in jeopardy. Hitler
withdrew Germany from not only the conference, but also from the League of Nations.
The German actions seemed not to surprise the British and American press. The
Washington Post noted in an article placed on page 3 that Germany had isolated itself
from the world community long before both the conference and League had existed. In a
page 13 story, The Times (London) stated that “the break-up of the Disarmament
Conference was predicted.”
Also in late 1933, the Anglo-American press reported—but again, deeply inside
most newspapers—on several German military demands made on primarily Britain,
France, and Italy. On page 12 of The Manchester Guardian, page 11 of The Times
(London), and page 4 of The Washington Post, articles discussed Germany’s continued
pursuit of armaments equality with the other powers, especially in aerial defenses. In
January 1934, The Manchester Guardian told readers in a story on page 15 that Germany
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and Poland had concluded a ten-year non-aggression pact. The newspaper interpreted the
signing of the agreement as “reinforcing Herr Hitler’s repeated promises of the Nazis’
peaceful intentions towards Poland.” However, a reading of Mein Kampf or a careful
observation of Hitler’s actions in contrast to his public proclamations indicated that he
could not be trusted and did pose a threat to Poland. Both the Guardian’s interpretation
of the pact, and the newspaper’s location of the story about it, gave the impression to
most of the paper’s readers that Hitler was not a danger to Poland or the world.
The planning for, and resumption of, the Disarmament Conference in May and
June 1934, and extensive coverage of the story by the British and American press, likely
helped to obscure for the press the rapidly escalating power struggle inside Nazi
Germany, between the SA, on the one hand, and Hitler and the regular German army, on
the other hand. Only on 16 May did an article in The New York Times, buried inside the
paper, note such a conflict; The Times (London) on page 14 reported that Nazi
government officials were speaking increasingly against “reactionaries” and “radicals” in
the Nazi Party—which, in fact, meant primarily the SA—and German military. Nor did
the British and American press appear much interested in the massive executions of SA
leaders during the night of 30 June 1934, carried out at Hitler’s direction by the SS with
the German army’s assistance. Newsweek then published an extensive article on the
purge, but almost two weeks after it had happened.
The death on 2 August 1934 of the German president, Paul von Hindenburg, and
Hitler’s immediate uniting in himself the offices of both president and chancellor, offered
a first instance in which the American press viewed events in Germany sufficiently
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important to place accounts of them at or near the front of papers and magazines. Such
examples included both The New York Times and The Washington Post, that seemed
alarmed at Hitler’s takeover of greater power in Germany. In contrast, the British press,
most notably The Manchester Guardian, covered such events on its back pages.
Although Hitler had increased even more his political position and dictatorship in
Germany, both the American and British press continued to bury deep inside its
publications the articles on subsequent issues like the suspected growing German military
strength (armaments and numbers of troops), the spread of Nazism to Austria (July
1934), and the return of the Saar region to Germany (January 1935).
It is difficult to estimate the Anglo-American press’s influence in such matters on
its readership. On the one hand, the large number of articles on the suspected German
rearmament and issues or events related to it—the Disarmament Conference; the
response of Britain and France to Hitler’s demands for armaments equality for Germany
and to the rumors of Nazi rearmament; and the Night of the Long Knives—provided
extensive information to the public. On the other hand, a reader had to dig deeply into
the back pages of the newspapers and magazines to find the stories, many of which had
small headlines or were of short length.
Most likely, readers in both the United States and Britain believed, from what
they saw in the major news media, that rearmament in Nazi Germany, and the latter’s
dictator, posed little danger to world peace. Nor did any reports in the press, even amid
Hitler’s public announcement of Germany’s rearmament in the spring of 1935, predict
the situation would change in the future. Most Americans and Britons, embroiled deeply
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in the troubles caused in their countries by the Great Depression, received little signal
from their major media outlets that German rearmament should command their greater
attention. In a couple of instances, the American press gave greater prominence to
rearmament than did its British counterpart. The latter’s lesser attention, especially that
of The Times (London), appeared to reflect the views of the London government and
numerous Englishmen that the Versailles treaty had been too harsh on Germany and that
the latter deserved some revision of the treaty’s clauses, including those ordering
substantial German disarmament.
Despite the general accuracy of the Anglo-American press reports, some of them,
as noted, contained minor factual errors, omitted or exaggerated information, and showed
some type of bias. On several occasions, newspapers and magazines erred in estimates of
numbers of German troops under arms and the number of German battleships and
military planes built and ready for use. Press reports of the rivalry between the SA and
German army, especially the extensive account in Newsweek following the purge of the
SA leadership on the night of 30 June 1934, lacked several important details or were
inaccurate in others. An article in The New York Times on the aftermath of the murder of
SA officials described erroneously the German population as full of “ever-growing
anxiety” about the purge and “stunned and dismayed by the suddenness and brutality” of
the killings. But recent historical scholarship has demonstrated that few Germans were
stunned or surprised by the executions of SA leaders.
Did the press leave its readers with a sense of biased reporting? Overall,
publications in both the United States and Britain reflected a marked pessimism among
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the British and French toward Germany and its actions during 1933 and 1934 in
rearmament and foreign policy. One could understand how Hitler’s demands for
armaments equality with Germany’s European neighbors, the use by the Germans of Nazi
and other paramilitary troops to increase the number of German men under arms, and
reports of German naval and military aviation expansion could leave even the most
optimistic person with concern for the future prospects of peace. Perhaps this explains
why the Anglo-American press tended to approve, already at the beginning of the Nazi
regime, of a kind of appeasement on the part of Britain and France toward Germany.
When Germany made a demand, press articles and editorial pieces tended to side with the
Reich. Perhaps the press viewed Germany as no threat to the world; or possibly press
reporters believed that if Britain, France, and the United States gave in to German
demands on rearmament and other revisions of the Versailles treaty, then international
tensions would subside and even more serious conflict could be avoided.
As shown in the introduction, the Nazi government controlled to a significant
extent the access the foreign press had in Germany to information. This held especially
true for highly sensitive political issues like the SA-army rivalry—and SA purge—and
any German rearmament made illegal by the Versailles treaty. Clearly, American and
British press correspondents were severely limited in the information they could gather.
They received carefully controlled daily news briefings from the Nazi propaganda
ministry and from wire reports of the major news services (Associated Press, Reuters),
and beyond that such reporters had to exercise great caution in gathering further
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information from German informants or other personal acquaintances. Furthermore, the
Nazis placed restrictions on the travel of foreign correspondents in Germany.
Readers were unaware of the censorship and restrictions placed on journalists by
the Nazi regime. Journalists were likely unable to reveal that they were being censored
and restricted just because of the nature of the censorship and restrictions. One could
even attribute some of the inaccuracies and bias to the oppressive nature of the Nazi
regime. That in itself was news because of what it revealed about Germany. While some
inaccuracies and bias existed, the newspapers and periodicals provided a picture of what
was occurring in the world at the time. These were the major sources of news and
information if people wanted to be informed.
Given the nature of Anglo-American press reporting during 1933 and 1934, one
can speculate that American and British readers did not believe Germany and its new
leader to be a serious menace to peace, then or in the future. Nevertheless, as the future
would reveal, Germany was a threat. The program of “secret” rearmament, begun by the
Germans as early as the 1920s, and continued and even accelerated during Hitler’s first
years in power in Germany, would represent the first stage in the Nazi dictator’s
determination to one day lead his country into a major war, or series of wars, against
Europe and beyond. These, he envisioned, would enable Germany to seize vast new
living space for its alleged master race, eliminate its most dangerous racial and political
rivals, the Jews and Slavs, and dominate the world. In 1939, barely four years after
Hitler’s public announcement of Germany’s rearmament, and following Germany’s
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takeover of Austria and Czechoslovakia, he would invade Poland and lead his country
into another bloody world war.
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